

Somaliland

From crisis to stability

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Introduction

The purpose of this study is to analyse strategies within the political elite in Somaliland for promoting post-conflict political stability and integration. The state collapse of the former Somalia is often linked to the politicizing of clans and I will also examine what facilitated this process historically and try to say something about the importance of clan in today's Somaliland. My thesis is based on a three-month fieldwork in Somaliland in 2001 where I did interviews with members of the elite and relevant and available literature on the Somali case in general and Somaliland in particular.

The African political reality has proved much more complex than the development school of the sixties thought and to adopt western style democratic models has not brought progress and prosperity to the African state or people. The initial assumption that the implementation of democracy, a political system assumed to be able to create equity and development for all its citizens has been proven wrong. The understanding of the African state has had to be revised and admittedly it is much more complex than initially thought. The African states are more often than not a mix of different ethnic groups that do not necessarily make out a homogenous nation. Due to the consequent lack of economic development, social, economic and political structures often labelled as "traditional" continue to work and where the "traditional" meets the adopted "modern" new structures of democratic governing and various forms of market liberalizations new practices occurs. The meeting between structures indigenous to Africa and Western style ideas of state building and the capitalist world economy is not always peaceful. State collapse and the term "failed states" have unfortunately become well known terms in the post-Cold War era. In Africa south of Sahara the state has yet to fulfil the hopes present at independence; self-determination, independence and social, economic and political integration. The case of Somalia stands out as the state collapse seems to be final or at least of an almost indefinite character. Since the government of Somalia formally broke down in 1991 there has been no government structures that have incorporated the whole territory of the former Somalia and in parts of the country, namely the south the conflicts are still abundant with consequences that are almost impossible to comprehend to the rest of the world. For almost twenty years the population has had no formal system able to integrate people in a functioning state. The infrastructure in many parts of the country is destroyed and basic health care, schooling and

clean water is either not available or left for NGOs to provide. That is if the situation is stable enough for them to work within the country. People live in an environment where shifting alliances among rivalling groups make life unpredictable and where violence is a key ingredient.

There are exceptions within the territory of the former Somalia. Somaliland, the former British Protectorate was able to oust the government forces from their territory in 1991 and as a result declared independence for the Republic of Somaliland. It took almost seven years to restore peace within Somaliland and it is both interesting in a more general context to look at what made the development possible from being part of a failed state with warring factions to a rather well defined political entity that has been able to re-establish law and order and create an environment for political, economic and social reconstruction and where the system seems to be able to contain conflicts in a non-violent way. It is important to keep in mind that every case of state failure is special in that it presents different historical, political, social and economic factors that have contributed to the disintegration in various ways. Anyhow, the Somaliland case is sure to have some characteristics that are identifiable in other cases and that could offer ideas and inspiration when it comes to possible strategies for conflict resolution in order to create stable environments for reconstruction and reintegration elsewhere. In a more limited context it is of course important to have some idea of the limitations and the possibilities that are present in the Somaliland case in order for the favourable stability to last. Last but not least, the Somaliland case is special in the sense that the reconciliation process that has facilitated the lasting stability was a local level strategy involving little assistance from the outside world. The local elites gathered and inspired by traditional patterns conflict resolution were able to over time settle internal conflicts and integrate all clan groups into a common system, the self proclaimed Republic of Somaliland. Many peace processes are international undertakings with neutral third parties and it is interesting to see how a local process performs and if local structures are able to somehow make the reconciliation process and the settlement more legitimate.

My study is limited to the former British Protectorate, Somaliland. This thesis will not deal with the political developments in the rest of what I choose to call the former Somalia. I will only deal with the former Somalia in order to establish the historical developments that lead to the state collapse and in order to identify political processes over time that seems to have a significant role inside of today's Somaliland. I would like to point out that the study is

relevant for the post-conflict period in general from 1997 up to 2001 when I did my fieldwork. There has been a transition towards more democratic political structures with the forming of political parties and several democratic elections have been held after the time of my study. My thesis does not take these developments into consideration. I hope that the reader will keep in mind that this thesis is not a part of a political debate of whether Somaliland in the future should be a part of Somalia if peace is successfully restored and a national government that has support from the population comes in place. My treating of Somaliland as a state rests on the fact that it has declared independence and has built up a structure that no doubt consists of common building blocks for states and they are to a considerable degree able to function as a formal state (Schoiswohl 2004).

My research questions are as follows:

- 1) What political strategies led to the disintegration of the Somali state in the early 90s?
- 2) In what way are the political strategies of the Somaliland elite promoting stability and political integration?

The first research question aims at describing historically politics of integration and disintegration in a Somali context. The political formations and strategies in Somaliland do not exist in a vacuum but should be traced backward in history. They consist of elements that pre-date the colonization of the Somalis in the late 1800s, the colonial experience and the subsequent post-independent experience with ten years of democratic elections and the experiment with scientific socialism that gradually became a repressive regime that finally collapsed after thirty years of independence. What is important to have in mind is that external and internal forces contributed to the development towards disintegration. When trying to answer this question it is important to look at external input but most important, to look at how local structures developed and responded to this input. It is common to look upon the African state as a passive recipient of both political and economic impulses but the African states are not first and foremost structured by external forces but these act together with conscious and intended strategies locally that together make up the political fabric of the African state.

In Somalia there are two factors in particular that I would like the reader to keep in mind One is the Somalis social structure of clan and the second the fact that the Somalis inhabit a

larger area than the former Somalia and have been seen as a homogenous group or rather a nation without a state (Laitin 1987).

The Somalis organize in clans that trace their descent back to the prophet Mohamed. This way of organizing themselves has been crucial in order to survive as pastoralists in a scarce environment. There are two major pastoral clans and one clan mainly occupied in agriculture. Both are divided into further sub-clans. The different clans are possible to separate from each other and on the supra-clan level it is possible to place them geographically. Clans do overlap in which areas they occupy on both supra- and intra-clan levels which means that they have overlapping economic interest. The social, political and economic fabric of the Somalis is structured around this patrilinear system of descent creating flexible but predictable structures of interaction on all levels in order to make co-existence possible. It is this clan structure that has made some commentators call the conflict ethnic. It is probably not right to call it ethnic in a strict sense but if one sees ethnic conflicts as basically competition over resources by groups that are defined and possible to separate then the Somali conflict matches this description to quite some extent. This structure of clan thus becomes a possible network to mobilize and my analyses will show the particular form it took in Somalia.

The Horn of Africa is inhabited by different ethnic groups and the Somalis are one of them. Somalia at independence was assumed to be one of the few African states that were inhabited by one ethnic group sharing a common language; Somali, a common religion; Islam and a common culture; the pastoral. The ethnic realities of the Somalis are more complex than that but it is possible to say that this conception of the Somalis as an ethnic nation has been embraced by the Somalis themselves. This idea of all Somalis being one nation and they should be joined in one state has had implications for political strategies since before independence since in fact not all Somalis reside within Somalia.

My second research question aims at finding out if the transitional system with indirect representation of clans in a democratic model is producing stability and why. I have chosen to look at the elite and how the political strategies they choose within the constitutional set-up might encourage or discourage integration horizontally and vertically. My analysis will look upon how the legislative and the executive relate to each other and also how the two chambers of the legislative relate to each other by letting the members of these two branches

of government describe and explain their own strategies and say something about how they perceive the other's strategies. Hopefully this will say something about the accountability between the branches. Strategies are seen as actively pursuing certain policies. In addition I have looked at what might be called passive strategies, the fact that certain policies are wanted but not carried out or seen as not satisfactorily carried out and interpreted as intentional or are in fact intentional. This should say if the system produces trust between the different groups and if it is predictable and thus promoting stability and horizontal integration on the elite level.

Next I look at how the system is perceived from below and say something about the meaning of clan in society and in politics in Somaliland. Clan is the basis for representation in the system and how well does the political system integrate civil society, the clans in this case and in what way? Does the system that is set up actually facilitate participation from below? Has the relationship between state and society changed after the state collapse and in what way? The approach will be the same, I look at how people who do not hold positions in the system see the State's performance and if there seems to be integrating strategies present or not.

In the next chapter I will elaborate on two different theories that say something about the logic of politics in development countries in general and elite strategies in Africa in particular. The first theory will be focusing on patrimonial networks of distribution. Secondly I will look at Bayart's theory of reciprocal integration of elites and the "politics of the belly". I will also outline a political theory of elite accommodation and consensus, Lijphart's consociational theory which has been used when analyzing politics of accommodation and power sharing in South Africa. These three combined will hopefully give insight into how there are both forces of integration and disintegration at work at the same time. In the next chapter I will outline the choice of method with an ethnographic approach that places me as a researcher in my research project. The first chapter of the analysis will look at the historical context the Somaliland state has emerged in putting emphasis on both internal, national, regional and international factors over time that in sum created the political strategies that led up to the collapse of Somalia and the Somaliland declaration of independence. I will also outline the formal set-up of the transitional system as it is the political structure that the elite strategies are structured around. The second chapter of the analysis will look at to what degree elite strategies in Somaliland facilitate

horizontal integration in the state apparatus and vertical integration between the state and civil society by using the clan system as a building block towards more democratic state formations. This will be done by looking at how the elite describe their own function in the system, their perception of accountability between branches and how they describe their relationship with other branches of government. The main findings being that there is considerable integration horizontally within the elite whereas the state/civil society integration is still hampered by clientelistic relationships due to lack of economic development.

Theory

The aim of this chapter is to establish a conceptual framework for the analysis. The first two theories are used in order to say something about vertical integration of elite/society and the second about horizontal integration within the elite. Clapham's view is admittedly a bit old fashioned in that the African state is seen as a recipient of impulses and dependent whereas Bayart has more focus on local responses to external input and the historicity of every African state. The third theory is a democratic theory of consociationalism which seeks to accommodate different elite segments.

Third World Politics

In his book "Third World Politics", Clapham's (1985) aim is to describe politics in third world countries. His thesis is that the most important difference between western politics and third world politics are the context they take place in. The differences are not possible to pin on a particular nature of people and politicians in the third world countries. Third world countries share three similar characteristics that constitute the context that third world politics are played out in. His first point is the peripheral character of these economies. For the greater part they are primary export producers. The big industrial economies of the West created the economic system of capitalism. They are in control of the most advanced technology and thereby are able to benefit more from the economic system. Second he also says that the third world is also peripheral in a social and culturally sense. The culture and languages of the West and in particular European countries have been imposed on third world countries and in several cases replace for instance the indigenous languages. His third characteristic of these countries is the fact that they often constitute artificial territories in the sense that the political territories did not arise from the people they governed.

His major point is that the third world per se was created by external forces and their ability to make free choices are only to the degree that they can chose different strategies to react to the externally imposed circumstances. He does on the other hand admit that the relationship of dominance and dependence did change after independence so that one also has to speak of an interaction between external and internal forces. The political systems before colonialism

and the introduction of the capitalist economy were much too diverse to make them possible to compare. Today the third world states are not formally linked to their colonial powers. Still, Clapham (1985) says that the state still has that elevated quality about it and those within see themselves as superior. At the same time those who are ruled see the state as an imposed structure that they have to accept and if possible exploit. This in turn makes the state in the third world the primary arena for political activity.

Different modes of colonial rule shaped the independent states differently. The French had assimilation as a major goal while the British ruled by indirect rule. One used already existing structures of power or reinvented old ones that had already disappeared. This was cheap but also caused anti-colonial movements to arise much earlier in British colonies.

Clapham says in his book that the view of the state in third world is that those who rule the state see themselves as superiors and thus not as servants of the population they are set to administer the state for. The ruled see the state as imposed on them rather than an elected structure constituted by the people. They have to accept and preferably try to take advantage of the state is also a structure of control. Its power radiates from the capital and regional governors, the police forces, the courts and the army are part of this power grid. Second and just as important features are the agencies that manage the state's economy. He says that the third world state in large lack developmental forces within and depends on being able to exploit the economy's integration into the world economy. The third world state has been unable to develop a hierarchical system of control because the state apparatus is so easily permeated by society. According to Clapham the colonial state did not have the same problem because of its foreign embeddedness and the fact that they were responsible towards themselves and not the general population. Only on the lowest levels was it possible to try to influence politics. These things combined make the state the main arena for politics to play out.

Clapham further says that this gives a lack of shared common goals and values between state and society which again is the source of what he calls political fragility. This is the weakness of legitimacy and legitimacy is a society's commitment to a set of given governmental institutions which allows for the election of leaders and to sustain them. The competition that one sees around the third world state reflects this lack of public values acceptable to

society and therefore possible to enforce. What makes the third world state survive is the fact that there are domestic and external interests that gain from its existence.

Neopatrimonialism.

Clapham uses Weber's rational-legal basis for legitimacy as the starting point of his analyses of the working of the third world state. Legitimacy is the existence of widely acceptable goals within the public and an acceptable system to achieve these goals. The separation of public and private roles in the exercise of one's office is crucial in order for a modern state to work. The ability to maintain a constitution is according to Clapham a good measure of legitimacy. In third world states the separation of public office and private affairs totally lacks and the constitutions are more often than not changed to suit the government in power and to regulate competition within the elite. Clapham goes further and says that the authority type of the third world countries is best described in terms of a Weberian patrimonialism.

Power is subscribed to person and not position. The key to understanding the actor is to realize that who you exercise your power on behalf of is more important than what powers that are ascribed to you. Your position is defined by who your clients are and vice versa who your patron is. The system hinges on loyalty which in many cases translates into kinship. Staying loyal to one's kin is considered a desirable social value. Clapham says that a typical way of managing the powers that is ascribed to the position one holds is to intervene in any matter one is entitled to whether necessary or not in order to demonstrate the personal character of the relationship between the patron and his subordinate clients. Humans naturally tend to not separate private and public and in Third world countries this form has survived from precolonial forms.

Corruption

Corruption where one uses a public position to achieve private goals is one of the primary characteristics of such a neo patrimonial system. Clapham explains this by the fact that precolonial values are practiced in a modern political system. They translate into bribery or extortion by. The giving of a gift makes bribery from below while the dominant class

extracts surplus by extortion from above. Due to the lack of liberal democracy weakness of accountability by the rulers is a dominant structural feature. Moving up socially through education, physically moving into a better neighborhood, getting a better job or position and a higher pay creates a distance between the patrons and the clients.

The state provides institutionalized inequality of power. The system is highly hierarchical and is not checked by the powers that are typically produced by capitalism and private property. Since the system has few control mechanisms even the lowest ranking officials are using their power to enrich themselves. Clapham says that the highly common conception among state employees at all levels that they are poorly paid, whether it is the reality or not leads them to use their power to gain economic benefits that enhance their position. The link to the international society is particularly beneficial to the elite. Officials have material gains from every import license and government contract that is given and external support is more often than not partly responsible for sustaining weak and vulnerable political regimes.

Patron and Clients

In order to stay in power it is crucial to have support from a larger segment of the population. This is achieved by the patron providing security for the client in return for support. The protection takes on many forms. The patron may give the client physical protection or he can provide land or development assistance. In return the client can vote for his patron, work or provide information among others. This kind of system is most common in societies with sharp class divisions but without any one coherent enough to act on their own. Clapham says that agrarian communities are the most common to practice this type of unequal but necessary exchange.

The neopatrimonial state is an equally appropriate arena for such structures. The main inequality in this arena is the difference between those who control or are able to control the state and those who are not. The same inequality exists within the system too based on hierarchical differences. In this setting a network right down to the grassroots level is created for distribution of benefits in order to create support. The system works as to make the local leaders with authority to the local communities benefit from creating support to patrons in the top echelon of the structure. For support from the lowest level local leaders might get a

higher position, their area might be granted funding for improving infrastructure or other development assistance. These clientelistic networks take on many forms. In Jamaica the unions play such a role and in Senegal the religious brotherhoods, and most often Somalia is analyzed through their ethnic affiliations; the clan. The consequence of clientelism is the upholding of the unequal power relations between the elite and the rest of the population. It is an effective system to prevent the lowest class to become strong enough to act on its own in order to strengthen common rights and needs. Clapham believes that clientelism will persist as long as people are vulnerable to political and economical circumstances since its particular structure seems to offer both patron and client the hope of thing getting better. For clients to pursue their goals through more objective mechanisms economic development that reduces their vulnerability has to take place. In some extreme cases the fact that a group falls totally out of the system and has nothing to loose can produce more revolutionary strategies from the clients.

Bayart's approach: The need for historicism.

Bayart (1993) points out that a major problem with the research and writing done by the social science on African politics has been that Africa's historicity has not been acknowledged until recently. In most cases the African polities have been seen as the passive receivers of input from the Western world that has shaped their political strategies exclusively. They are the dependant of a world economy that favors the advanced capitalist economies and which leave the poor countries with few real options in forming their own policies. There has also been given little attention to African political culture before colonization. The colonization process and eventually decolonization has been seen as the single most shaping events on today's political culture and structures in countries south of Sahara. The complexity of African polities has been ignored to a large extent and their strategies reduced to being deterministic and void of internal dynamics.

He points particularly to the process of dependency and how African elites have been able to use their dependency on Western capital to obtain internally structured material aspirations. When going in to describe how politics and culture react to the influence from the West undue focus has been put on what the input has consisted of. Little attention has been given to the fact that any input is structured in different ways according to the receiving society

and its economic, cultural and political structure. Indigenous agents vigorously and consciously integrated and dismissed outside influence. Earlier writings have done the mistake of seeing African societies as passive recipients when they in fact shape and are in control of their internal environment and are important actors in shaping the outcome of their integration with the Western world.

It is important to realize that Africa's political history did not begin with colonization. African societies have been involved in various relationships both internally and externally that have had a deciding effect on how they have developed from long before colonization and towards the present. Bayart points specifically towards the fact that the internal social struggle on the continent has been a deciding force on how their unequal relationship with the rest of the world has developed. This social struggle goes back centuries. The major reason why central states did not develop until the last part of the twentieth century was the resistance of the dominant groups of being organized in a central state structure and their willingness to do what was necessary in order to protect their right to self determination and control over their productive forces.

Bayart's Hypothesis of Reciprocal Assimilation of Elites

Bayart (1993) introduces three different scenarios in the pursuit of hegemony in Africa. Conservative modernization and social revolution represent the extreme counterparts. The former is when a dominant group stays in power the latter when the dominant group is removed from power by social revolution and a segment of the subordinate groups rise to power. The hypothesis of the reciprocal assimilation of elites is a third and less extreme scenario. This is the scenario Bayart focuses on as a motor of both stability and conflict and that I will further outline here.

His claim is that around the continent there is an ongoing process of assimilating the elite segments of different ethnic and social groups into the state matrix (Bayart 1993). The goal is to create stable and lasting coalitions. Politically stable regimes are often characterized by this process of bringing different elite segments together in a process of accumulation. He suggests that the same process might as well be found in states that are ridden by crises. The process of reciprocal assimilation of elites may take place in heterogeneous settings. Even though the political systems and power structures vary from country to country it will be

possible to identify this process. Seemingly contradictory political systems will be able to produce the same scenario of reciprocal assimilation.

There are two bases for reciprocal assimilation of elites; civil society and political society (Bayart 1993). Civil society is understood in a Marxian sense to comprise of the family and the clan in a broad sense. In order to avoid the easy acceptance of difference occurring along the lines of lineage and power as presented in terms of family he further says in accordance with Marx more precise definitions of civil society that it will not develop without a bourgeoisie.

Within civil society Bayart (1993) identifies different arenas where such assimilation may occur. Funeral ceremonies are used to distinguish the deceased and his rank within society. They are social gatherings that officials in variously will attend and the links between the deceased and powerful segments of society are acknowledged and thereby renewed and sometimes established. Marriage is another arena where such fusion of elites takes place. Unions are made that create new coalitions geographically, ethnically and socially. Institutions of higher education have also played the same role as have more mystic societies like free masonry and Islamic brotherhoods. Within the business world similar processes take place where multifunctional alliances are made and sustained through various practices. Material relations between individuals are thus shaped in a specific way according to Bayart in order to pursue hegemony and facilitate accumulation.

Political society offers further arenas for the reciprocal assimilation of elites. Civil society and political society intersect through various institutions and practices and the fact that the division between the two is often blurred in African societies makes it impossible to separate and treat them as two different arenas. Civil society acts within political society through various institutions like trade unions, parliament and political parties.

The party is by Bayart (1993) identified as one of the five practices that contributes and facilitates the creation and structuring of a dominant class. Political parties developed alongside colonialism and have been a major arena for horizontal integration of the elite segments. It is quite common for traditional leaders to be represented in the party. There seems to be little contradiction between the multiparty system and the single party system. The African single party system is characterized to a great extent by a culture of conflict but

also of negotiation. There is continuously an ongoing process of negotiating between patron and client, and elites that are separated geographically, economically or socially.

Secondly Bayart (1993) points to *elections* as crucial in the process of bringing the elites together. Electoral rules seem to favor the groups that are pursuing hegemony, those who own land and are wealthy or have a favorable position due to inherited position or age. Other groups are kept out of the process through various repressive means and legal regulations. Both the processes of confrontation and consensus building, however contradictory they seem, bring together powerful echelons of society.

The real melting pot though seems to be *the bureaucracy* where the administration and army seems to cause a true social and geographical mixture of people to organize around common principles of organization, consumption and technology (Bayart 1993). The bureaucracy is a true child of colonialism and has not lost its significance and power after independence. In variously the bureaucracy is used to integrate more traditional elites, to invite segments of the elite that have been shut out for a period to join the dominant elite and it has a prime role in negotiating with elites on the local level. This is also where the recruitment for offices takes place and it also serves as a buffer in the sense that a position in the bureaucracy often is used to keep conflict from arising due to the falling position of certain groups. Instead of pushing them out and provoke a counter mobilization of that particular elite segment they can be kept inside of the system yet in a less favorable position through the bureaucracy.

By *chieftaincy* Bayart (1993) refers to power positions that were both created by colonialism and those that preceded it. The position is acquired through individual political or economic performance. Some are based on lineage as often is the case with colonial chieftaincy and some are results of a rotational system where changes are brought about through conflict. A very common practice is that those who already have a so called “traditional” position also hold positions in the bureaucracy, political offices or are businessmen or other types of professionals. If you belong to either group it is common to try to enter the other, get a traditional title or enter political life or business.

The formulation of a *political ideology* of the dominant group further enhances the reciprocal assimilation of elites. It is important that the ideology embraces the heterogeneity of the country and is able to explain just about anything. Though this might make it practically void of actual and realistic descriptions of conditions it serves as a uniting factor.

In a linguistic term most countries in Africa chose to use the administrative language of the colonial powers as the state language in order to demonstrate that one has a focus on unity and cooperation versus the segmentary tendencies of the past. In Tanzania Swahili has the same function even though it is an African language. In the case of Somalia Bayart says that cultural homogeneity explains the use of Somali. Still Italian and English have been important languages in an administrative sense and still are. What is important to understand is that the difference between the scholarly language and the popular language is a source of power to the elite.

Bayart's (1993) main conclusion is then that it is impossible to claim as much literature do that there is one dominant class which is the tenant of the postcolonial state but rather that the state is an instrument in the hands of a class in formation. The reciprocal assimilation of the elite works toward the creation of a dominant class but he finds no evidence that such a class exists today. The process is in different stages in different countries due to quite different historical conditions. The lack of historicism makes it difficult to evaluate this emerging class' power to reproduce itself and how it affects the social and economic situation of society. The assimilation of elites and pursuit of hegemony predates the atomization of the African continent by the West.

At the same time the forces of divergence seems to be as much a part of the creation of a dominant class as a hinder. No where in Africa is it possible according to Bayart to observe a dominant class defined in the tradition of Marx: A class aware of itself that thinks of itself and sees itself as a unity and acts as such. Everywhere you look the class that controls the state can not be seen as a unity but the sum of individual strategies. In order to clarify Bayart uses Giddens insistence on a contextual definition of social stratification where both mechanisms of creation and dissolution of social groups are equally important.

A postcolonial historical bloc

In order to explain the somewhat complexity of this process which is both a process of integration and divergence Bayart turns to Gramsci's concepts of *passive revolution* and *historic bloc* in order to make the multi dimensional meaning of the quest for hegemony apparent.

In Africa “passive revolution” refers to the educated elites rise to power and seizure of state power and their refusal to enhance and radicalize the popular movements against colonialism. It also describes how the educated group has reached an agreement with the former elite in power and thereby reproduced the process on a larger scale (p 181). This makes the theories of Sklar and Balandier more evident, that today’s inequality in Africa is the result of post-colonial processes and it facilitates a comparison with other theories of authoritarianism in various continents where the exact same cooperation between groups has been vital in state building through passive revolution. Instead of allying themselves with the lower social echelons the intellectuals have allied themselves with the ruling elite. The post colonial state has made an effort in order to suffocate social movements and make them impotent. By cooptation either by force or voluntarily the existing elite have managed to absorb any element that could threaten their monopoly to power, leaders of trade unions, workers and peasant movements have been integrated in the state apparatus and thus prevented from building up radicalized counter movements with basis in the people. In the urban areas the demolition of illegal squatter settlements also testifies to the states lack of will to support and accept radicalization on the grass root level. Budding leadership of the small men’s organizations are destroyed and land rights are manipulated. The alternative strategy of assimilation is striking deals with the leadership of potentially disruptive organization in the state’s point of view that does not bring anything to the state other than absence of open conflict. The quite common restrictions on the freedom of association that are found in almost every country south of Sahara is another effective way of keeping the intellectuals from allying themselves with subordinate social groups. There are also attempts to incorporate religious intellectuals into the state structure but this is much harder to control.

Bayart says that by using the concept of a historic postcolonial bloc it is possible to avoid describing the state along ethnic or regional divisions as has been common up to now. It identifies the alliances that the intellectuals have formed over the last century, the fusion of elites and it enables us to get rid of the opposition that former studies have seen between ethnic explanations, dependency and class and instead a synthesis becomes apparent. In Africa today there probably is not one historic bloc or one dominant established class but using the term of “passive revolution” and the “quest for hegemony” it is possible to say that these processes have local, regional and international ramification and there is a movement towards one historic bloc and not many regional. The realization of the postcolonial historic

bloc differs from country to country as does the degree of articulation with the western world, the type of articulation and the consequences of this articulation. Most important it is not possible to stop at the national level when applying his theory because the assimilation of elite takes place on a pan African level and they again are integrating with the western world.

The Sub-Saharan countries' articulation with the western world does not produce uniform regimes. Different countries are integrated to various degrees; some are marginalized in terms of the historic bloc while others have withdrawn. Multinational organizations greatest achievement is the creation of a political domain rather than their economic performance. The forming of the postcolonial bloc also gravitates towards certain regions with permanent fluctuation that are decisive in individual countries' reproduction of inequality. In order to understand this production of inequality it is necessary to have knowledge of the states' articulation regionally and their history of articulation with the West, the Arab world and the Asian Diaspora which all have created different practices over the continent, is necessary.

Lijphart's consociational democracy

Lijphart's consociational theory was first formulated in the late sixties. His inspiration was amongst others an analysis by Lewis who wrote about politics in West-Africa. A second early contributor to the writings on consociational systems was a Nigerian political scientist, Claude Ake in his book: "The theory of political integration" in 1967. None of the books uses the term consociationalism but both describe consociational political structures and strategies. After Lijphart took into use the term consociationalism which was originally used by Althusius, the theory was mainly applied to analyzing European countries like Belgium, The Netherlands and Switzerland. The main empirical evidence of consociationalism is according to Lijphart Lebanon and Malaysia where indigenous political leaders developed the system without any external Western influence. As apartheid was drawing towards an end in the eighties Lijphart himself formulated his last version of his power-sharing theory of consociationalism related to the South-African political realities. His book: "Power-Sharing in South-Africa" (1985) must be seen as an attempt to analyze how different democratic models would work in the South-African reality. He also tries to answer to the

critiques on consociationalism and to show what makes consociationalism a viable political system for South-Africa. I will outline his prescription for a consociational democracy in South Africa and also look at some of the criticism that has been launched against consociational theory and dealt with by the author in this book.

In order to define a society as pluralistic Lijphart has listed certain criterions in order to say something about in which instances the theory can be useful. Societal pluralism is present if it is possible to define the different segments in society clearly. The segments must also be possible to define accurately in numbers. Social, economic and political organization should also coincide with segmental boundaries. Last but not least, the segment should receive the stable electoral support from their own segment. If all these characteristics are present in a society Lijphart defines it as pluralistic. His definition of democracy is from Robert A. Dahl and equals his term polyarchy. According to Dahl (1977) polyarchy are regimes that are highly inclusive and open to public contestation. Dahl takes democracy to be a regime that is responsive to the preferences of all its citizens and where everybody are seen as political equals and depends on that all citizens have unimpaired opportunities. The citizens must be able to formulate their preferences, to signify their preferences to their fellow citizens and the government both through individual and collective action and their preferences should be weighed equally in the conduct of the government with no discrimination because of the content or source of the preference (p. 2). He says that very few if any system exist that can be truly called a democracy and his polyarchy is a system close to democracy.

In his book Lijphart (1985) comes with eight optimal consociational guidelines for South-Africa and I will use these as they can be seen as his final formulation of his theory on consociational democracy. First there should be absolute freedom of association, individual freedom of affiliation and free competition among groups and parties (p 81). In this way Lijphart believes that the segments will emerge spontaneously and not be predetermined. Thus it should be possible to avoid a predetermined definition of the segments as racial, ethnic or cultural biased. Second, proportional legislative elections should be used on all levels. Third, at all levels the executive should be proportionally constituted collegial bodies, elected or appointed. Fourth, also the civil service, including the police, the armed forces and the judiciary should be guided by proportionality when appointing officials. Fifth, group autonomy should be the result of a combination of territorial and corporate federalism. Sixth, the boundaries of a territorial federation should be drawn as to create economically viable

and administrative effective entities with relatively homogenous populations. These states should also have consociational constitutions since complete homogeneity seems difficult to obtain. Seventh, Cultural and educational autonomy should be obtained through corporate federalism. The organization might be either private or public. Eight and last, a minority veto should be available to even the smaller groups and should consist of an absolute veto on fundamental issues, defined as cultural by Lijphart and a suspensive veto on non-fundamental issues. These are by Lijphart seen as the optimal conditions but not the only feasible.

Criticism of the consociational theory has been many-fold and Lijphart himself has categorized it into six categories. I will look into a few of them as they seem to have some interesting reservations towards a consociational theory that are necessary to keep in mind when analyzing countries in the lower economic income strata in the world.

The first category challenges that consociationalism is likely to lead to durable peace and democracy. It claims that the relationship between democracy and stability in countries that are considered consociational are either spurious or the causality should be reversed, where there is democracy consociationalism can follow and not the opposite. This strand of criticism seems to think that consociational systems are prone to run into certain problems that is going to make them unsuccessful. Switzerland which is considered by Lijphart to have a consociational political system of separation into cantons, the proportional representation on both national and cantonal level and their initiative and referendum initiative. The disagreement seems to be related to which function the different elements can have. The referendum is by critics seen to be a way of letting the majority impose their solution on the minority. Lijphart sees the referendum as a tool that makes most parties consider compromise in order to avoid that groups with enough power can ask for a referendum, a costly process. This means that it can function as a minority veto and a consociational feature of the Swiss system. Lebanon's consociational rule that evidently failed after several decades has also been seen as an example of the failure of consociationalism. Lijphart points to the fact that in order for a consociational rule to work it has to change with society. In Lebanon the Christian majority slowly became a Moslem majority without the fixed ratio for parliament giving the Christians a majority of the seats being changed even though the Moslems over time had become the majority. To some critics this shows the inability of consociational system to adapt to the changing circumstances

while to Lijphart this merely tells that it is necessary for a consociational system to improve over time and that replacing it might not be the best solution given that it in many cases is the only feasible alternative in order to achieve some form of democratic system. Another point of Lijphart's is that the conflicts of Lebanon are not as much internal conflicts as they are regional, inter-Arab conflicts projected on internal divisions. This I think actually is a more serious part of the criticism against consociationalism in plural societies. This suggests that it is actually necessary to take into account what tension material that is available in the region and possible to project down on a national level. It would be naive to say that it is possible to make a divide between "ordinary international conflicts" as Lijphart calls them and internal conflicts if the segments of the consociational system are not restricted to being inside the consociational entity. This means that one of the factors that one has to consider is the likelihood of conflicts becoming international with basis in internal division since this will cause extra strain on a system if they are realized.

Some have also questioned whether a consociational system can work for ethnic conflicts or is better suited for religious or class conflicts. In the latter the will to make compromise is greater since they are more organized and willing to follow their leader while in ethnically segmented societies there is no need for organization in order to rebel against the system as long as their segment is distinguishable. Organized groups tend to differ on how to run the country while ethnic conflicts tend to be deeper and question the actual political entity.

Lijphart seems to be of the opposite opinion. Ethnic segments organize in much the same way as other groups. Their differences are easier to reach compromise over since they are not based in ideological and religious differences which he tends to believe are more difficult to work around. Marxists have launched the same criticism, believing that ideological and class conflicts are deeper and more challenging than what they call superficial ethnic and cultural conflicts. They also claim that consociationalism does not consider class conflict and thereby is unable to deal with that type of conflict. Class conflict will not be promoted or articulated. Lijphart himself agrees to the fact that if the segments are more or less equal in socioeconomic terms the conditions for consociationalism are more favorable. He also believes that the countries that have practiced consociationalism have been just as successful in dealing with evening out the socioeconomic differences in their society.

The system is also believed to be more inefficient than others. The minority veto may hamper political decision processes and segmental autonomy might lead to unnecessary duplication of different governmental units and other facilities like schools. Lijphart argues that in the long perspective the costs are lower because the system in the long run avoids creating more tension on behalf of the minority groups that are bound to be overlooked in a majoritarian system. Still this is a problem that should be taken serious in the event that a consociational system is adapted in a poor country. The ability to provide the institutional infrastructure that a consociational system needs in order to function and being able to have a long term outlook on the effect this system should have might be impossible for countries that are deeply divided by conflict. It will be important to ask the question how long the public will accept that a very large proportion of the states income will go to administration rather than improving for instances public services like health care and fresh water.

A second strand of criticism claims that it is wrong to claim that majoritarian rule can not succeed in plural society. Lijphart's argument is that there is nothing to suggest that this is impossible but a consociational system has a better chance of success in a plural society.

Very often it is the only alternative as majoritarian rule is not seen as an option.

Consociationalism has the strength of the segments being equal as opposed to a system where "control" is used. This is a situation where a superior power of a dominant segment mobilizes in order to control the possibility for other segments to act politically and their opportunities. Lijphart argues that this rarely can be seen as a democratic system and that a consociational system is more democratic. Others have argued that there are no evidence to support that consociational democracies do better in plural societies in the third world than any other type of democracy. Lijphart seems to have a different opinion and points to that only India seems to be a successful majoritarian democracy but it does have consociational features and can not be seen as a case that proves a majoritarian systems ability to absorb conflict and refute the usefulness of systems built on consociational principles.

The third type of criticism asks whether consociationalism is a cause or and effect in plural societies. It is stated that some of the consociational systems are not really plural societies, that the cleavages and segmentation of some consociational systems have been deepened and enhanced as a result of the consociational features of the system. Some of the cases that Lijphart consider consociational systems like the Swiss and the Austrian are by others not seen as plural societies and it is therefore hard to argue that consociationalism is the cause of

their political stability. Another attack on consociational theory is the claim that some leaders promote pluralism and consociationalism in order to secure their own position by institutionalizing the problems of society and partially solving some of the problems. In this way a continuous need for leadership is created and the system is perceived as somewhat efficient. The Marxist take on this is that the cleavages are created and maintained by the politicians in order to mask class and suppress class conflict. Lijphart argues that it would be more beneficiary to leaders who wanted to stay in power to encourage segmentation and antagonism than to actually work out compromises with the competing segments. Still this is a point that should be kept in mind because very few systems are as transparent as desired and in a consociational system this lack of transparency would very much build up under the conception of politicians being in the system for spoils rather than representing their group and working for equal opportunities and development for all the parties represented. The class issue is by Lijphart answered by saying that the segments should be more rather than less homogenous in socioeconomic terms in a consociational system. Further he believes that this type of criticism to a large extent underestimates the importance and strength of segmental divisions. Class cleavages are certainly important but so are other cleavages and they have to be taken seriously. (Lijphart sees them as facts and not figments of the elite's imagination, unlike "imagined communities")

Consociational systems at work have been criticized for not being democratic at all. The main issue seems to be that countries that are seen as consociational by Lijphart to a large degree are seen as having quite closed and secretive decision processes. Another issue is that this kind of elite democracy where the elite control the electoral lists is easily manipulated. Both arguments are interesting but none the less a problem of majoritarian democracies as well. Still it is important to consider if in a consociational democracy these two elements are more easily manipulated than in others democratic systems. It is certainly not correct to imply that a consociational system automatically is less democratic.

Lijphart also sets up nine favorable conditions in order to set up a consociational system and maintain it. These are by him not seen as necessary or sufficient but merely conditions that facilitate a consociational system. By not claiming that they are necessary his critics react. Some think that in order for Lijphart's conditions to be relevant they have to be necessary otherwise they are not likely to be conditions at all but that the relationship between these conditions and consociationalism is spurious. This is by far too strict standards for a theory

in the social science and is likely to disqualify more than Lijphart's consociational theory as well

The lack of a majority segment is one of Lijphart's conditions. If there exists a segment that makes up the majority of the population it is less likely that that this segment will adhere to the rules of consociationalism but rather use majoritarian measures in order to influence decision making. The segments should also be relatively equal in numbers and the number of segments should be small. In addition the population should be small also.

An external threat is seen as favorable in the sense that it can have a unifying effect on the different segments. It is therefore important that the threat is perceived the same by all the segments. Critics note that an external threat would increase the pressure on the system and possibly be a negative factor. Lijphart thinks that an overriding identity also is of importance as it makes the different segments have a share feeling of being a entity.

Socioeconomic equality is another favorable condition. If there are segments that are significantly wealthier than others a consociational system might seem threatening to this particular group. The challenges here are many. In for instance most countries south of the Sahara a wealthy elite is believed to find a system of accommodations threatening. In the cases where consociationalism is not seen as threatening the system still must have enough resources in order commit to a politics of redistribution.

The last two conditions are that the segments should be geographically concentrated. This is because it makes it easier to establish segmental autonomy through federalism and decentralization. Last but not least there should be traditions for accommodation among the segments.

Concluding remarks

In this chapter I have outlined three theories that should contribute to understanding the dynamics of the Somaliland state's effort to integrate all groups and segments of society in order to promote stability in particular but also the historical development toward collapse of Somalia in 1991. Clapham focuses on the patron/client relationship in a hierarchical structure and how the lack of economic development will keep these kinds of uneven

networks going since there is little other hope of improvement. He focuses on how power is subscribed to person and not position and how the link to the international society is so profitable to the elite that being in position becomes crucial. Bayart points out that the African state has been able to profit from its dependency and how this creates material aspirations locally. His major point is that there is an ongoing process of reciprocal assimilation of elites and that this process can have both integrating and disintegrating force. He talks of the ongoing formation of a historic postcolonial bloc that as a concept makes it possible to understand the fusion of elites in Africa without looking towards ethnic, regional and class explanations. Lijpart's theory gives a prescription for power-sharing within elites representing identifiable groups within society. Representation of all groups and the possibility to exercise vetoes in order to protect the group's interest are key ingredients. It is also favourable if the different segments are homogenous in socioeconomic terms and share some common idea of being an entity.

Method

In this I have chosen to first say something about the researcher's role in producing knowledge. I had an assumed advantage since I had family in the area and assumed knowledge and understanding of the field I wanted to do research in that was structured by these family ties. This has consequences for what you have access to of information but also how you interpret the data you collect. I further say something about how your contacts are important in structuring the access to the field and move on to describe my choice of method, the qualitative research interview and how they were carried out and discussing how me being married to a Somali might have had implications for my research. I then say something about using secondary literature and how it reflects different positions and can not be said to be neutral.

Assumed insider or just another outsider?

My initial interest in the case stemmed from the fact that I was married to a Somali and in that way got a much more detailed and complex understanding of Somali culture, religion, politics and society than I had had before and than what was portrayed in media. It became natural to take advantage of the fact that I in that respect had a family there that could help me get started with my fieldwork and one also is under the assumption that as a part of the community through marriage one can get insight and access to the field in a different way than if one was totally on the outside.

Being so personally involved in the culture and society that I went into makes it important to reflect over the consequences this has for my research (Hammersley and Atkinson 1996). As a Somali family of the Diaspora the expectations to us as an economic unit were probably much higher and different from that of others. Because my husband had ties in the communities we moved around in it created an awkward situation of us not being entirely sure of what was expected of us in terms of contributing economically. We did in many ways support parts of his family but tried in general to keep a low profile, not hiring expensive cars and we chose to live in a predominantly Somali township. But no matter how Somali you are of origin you totally depend on those who stayed behind in order to make

your way around and this bond between them and you constitutes of expectations of giving back to the community in a material way. Doing research in this context did create some challenges because you always had to try to strike a balance between being a Somali with obligations of a more serious and long lasting character and being a foreigner and researcher.

Being part of a Somali family made me quite aware of my appearance. I did in many more ways consider what was expected of me both in terms of behavior and dressing. The people you meet will always try to place you in some social context in order to relate to you. One way of making people relate to you more easily is to try to make your outer appearance fit in. The working identity that you create for yourself is supposed to enable you to use your skills and the knowledge you already have (Hammersley and Atkinson 1996). In my case that did not seem as much of an option as something I somehow felt I had to do. During the whole stay I wore a veil. As a European it was not necessary for me to do so. Most foreign women I saw in Hargeysa wore western clothes and no one covered their heads. And either ways I stood out, in my Somali neighborhood but also among Westerners who automatically saw me as a white woman who had converted to Islam and were more cautious about taking contact. What became important was to signal my attachment to the community but at the same time not dress in a religious way as I am not a Muslim. I solved this by only wearing Somali dresses in thin cotton and never the more heavy clothed *hijabs*. I did experience some pressure from other women in the family to dress even more properly but it seemed that I most of the time got recognition for trying to respect local customs.

The segregation between the sexes is very acute in Somali communities. Men and women dine separately and rarely stay in the same room socializing. Women are not expected to not communicate with men in public but there are definitely rules of conduct to observe. This I became quite aware of during my stay. As a female doing research in a predominantly male political community I did run into some obstacles. For one it seemed that my husband for instance was more aware of the fact that I was a woman in a man's world. He would comment on me laughing out loud for instance in the company of men when doing interviews. He also seemed worried that I would take up too much time of the people I interviewed and would ask me to cut it short when we got close to an hour. The Somali culture is an oral culture and the conversation is a valued and time consuming part of every ones lives, especially men. In my case it became a liability that I was a Somali wife and that what was considered appropriate came into play more than it might have done otherwise. It

seemed interviews were cut short due to the fact that the Somali code of conduct applied more to me than it would have with any other Western woman. Men can talk for hours, women in the company of men is a different cup of tea. What at least seems to be the case is that you tend to let assumed expectations from your surroundings dictate what you choose to do and how you interpret the behavior of others and ultimately put limitations on your self in regard of what is acceptable and possible

Getting access to the case

In order to get the insight that I needed into Somali political life and institutions fieldwork seemed to be a natural choice of method. The former Somalia collapsed in the late 80s and in Somaliland that I wanted to study internal conflicts were frequent up to 1996. The consequence of this unstable situation was that there had been produced less academic literature in the conflict period than desired if one wanted to do a study of only secondary literature. The political system I wanted to look into was set up quite recently and in a transitional period and not very well documented. The lack of recognition internationally might also have contributed to the meager amount of literature that was produced on the subject. By going there I got the possibility to experience the phenomenon that I wanted to study and to gather the necessary information in order to try to answer my research questions.

It can often be difficult to get access to the case that you want to study. This is a problem experienced both before entering the field and during fieldwork (Hammersley and Atkinson 1996). Initially I had to make sure that it was possible to go to Somaliland without too much risk other than those you usually run into when going to countries in other climates and with less stable and predictable political and social systems than in the western world. By talking to members of the Somali community in Oslo and contacting family in the area I wanted to visit I was able to conclude that Somaliland had seen substantial improvement in security over the last few years, communication with surrounding states and the Gulf states were good and no particular risk was attached to going there as a foreigner. The first condition for my research project was fulfilled.

Who you get to interview will often be directed just as much by the contacts you use as your own preferences (Hammersley and Atkinson 1996). My husband's brother introduced me to my main contact "Abdi". He knew him as a teacher of Arabic a few years back. He helped me because he found my project interesting and probably because he was asked by a good friend; my brother in law. He was either making interview appointments for me or contacted others that could do it. There is always a danger that one gets access to a certain type of people holding particular political views when you access the field through one door keeper. "Abdi" was a learned Muslim that had studied the Quran for years. He had worked as a schoolteacher for years. When we were there he worked as an engineer in one of the biggest providers of bank and telecommunication services in Somaliland and the former Somalia. He was a key employee, responsible for the installation of the cell phone network in the region and he also worked with computer hard and soft ware at the main office in Hargeysa. In the early nineties he was active in a radical Islamic group. As most Somalis that stayed in the country during the civil wars he had experienced life in the refugee camps in Ethiopia several times. Through him and his network of friends, colleagues and business associates we got in touch with a broad specter of people ranging from people loyal to government politics through opposition politicians to Islamic "puritans". He seemed to be pro-Somaliland but still very tuned into the conflict material that was present in the public and because of this he did put me in contact with people that would be able to give me descriptions of the workings of the political community along lines that coincided with oppositional groups to the government.

It is easy to become trapped in your initial assumption of what is possible to achieve and who will be available to you (Hammersley and Atkinson 1996). As I got down there I realized during the first few weeks that all groups were represented in the system, even the groups that are not considered Somali and that are outside the Somali's social structure of clan. The tensions in the system were by no means exclusively defined by struggle between groups that lacked representation and thereby influence. My main contact also seemed able to put me in touch with people that I had not planned to talk to initially. I was e.g. able to interview high officials appointed by the president. Among these were mayors of major towns and ministers of the sitting government. Because of this my strategy changed after arrival from wanting to talk to only elected representatives to try to talk to as many different people as possible, different in the meaning of clan, position and outlook on the political

system. From thinking that I should try to get a representative sample I chose to pursue a strategy of using key informants and not let clan be the deciding factor. I still tried to make sure that the respondents that I interviewed were from several different major clans so that it would be possible to recognize differences in strategy between the different groups if there were any.

The only groups that I did not pursue to interview were those considered to be non-Somalis like the Midgan, Jibir and Tuumale. My intent was to study the formal system and by excluding these groups that are minorities and not integrated in the system in the same way as Somali clans I lost some of the complexity of Somali politics, because as the system matures it will indeed be important to see how the system deals with this kind of caste segmentation that actually exists inside of Somali communities.

Another group that fell outside of my study was women which are more than half the population in Somali communities. The reason for this was that official political life in Somali communities was dominated by males and the patrilinear clan structure. This does not mean that women are not present and do not have an impact in politics, quite the contrary I would say and this does represent a weakness in the study. As I was looking at official structures it became difficult to integrate women into my study.

My informants were drawn from all over the system, from elected representatives, both ordinary and elders, appointed officials, people working in the administration but also people outside of the system that were either politically involved or had knowledge about topics that I found relevant to get a better understanding of the political and social structure in Somaliland. The use of key informants became a necessary tool in order to get enough information as it seemed difficult to get appointments that were missed rescheduled and because of my own health situation that contributed to less time doing interviews.

The Qualitative Research Interview

I decided to make qualitative research interviews my main source of information. This is a tool to get empirical knowledge of the informant's daily life. By asking question you learn

about the informant's life world in their perspective. There is seldom discussion about the truth and the logic behind the statements that are made (Kvale 1997). The advantage of this approach is that you can accumulate a large amount of data in relatively short time. You can also follow up information during the interview and have the informant explain and clarify things that you do not understand. The main problem with this form of gathering data is that you are very dependent of the informant's cooperation. Lack of understanding of the language and codes that exist in the arena you enter may lead to communication problems. The respondent may not understand what you are asking for and give answers that are either short or off the point or you may lose important meanings because you are not enough familiar with the language and social codes (Marshall and Rossman 1995).

My interviews were semi structured. I would do this in the way that I had a long list of possible questions that were categorized into bigger topics. I would use some of the topics and my own suggested questions in order to get the conversation onto a topic that was of interest to me. The respondent was free to choose what to focus on under these circumstances. The danger is that the conversation is sidetracked and you get information that you find irrelevant. The advantage is of course that it gives more opportunities to go deeper into topics that seem more interesting than others. It also opens up for discovering new perspectives that you have not seen due to lack of knowledge. Attitudes that are contrary to your prior perception of the issues under study are also easier let into the conversation due to the lack of rigid control and can deepen and widen your understanding. The opposite is also possible, that you will allow too much time to be spent on confirming your prior perception of the case and thereby lose the opportunity to get new understanding. This is perhaps particularly true in my case where I was considered to have an understanding of the Somali community, religion and political culture that corresponded more with that of the respondents themselves because I was in many ways considered a Somali by marriage.

My husband came along to every interview and translated when the interviews were conducted in Somali. Using a translator is not the ideal situation because you lose meaning as you go from one language to another. My advantage was that he would translate directly into Norwegian for me and I avoided going through a third language. Most interviews were taped in order to be able to go in afterwards to check the information. This might have a negative effect on the respondent's willingness to talk freely. Most of the people I talked to were men of some influence and they did not seem inhibited by the tape recorder. After the

fieldwork was done my husband would go in and check that his translations were correct and that he had not missed anything. He could also explain more contextual stuff that went unsaid later. The biggest problem when dealing with Somali is that it is a highly oral culture and they use a lot of time and words to explain things. In order to get a proper understanding one needs to know the oral traditions of proverbs and stories to get the right meaning. In that sense my husband had the disadvantage of having left Somaliland at the age of sixteen and his understanding of Somali language and culture was hampered by this fact and it could affect his translation of the interviews done in Somali.

Using a family member as translator does have several advantages but it also constitutes challenges. Because my husband knows me well he would not be shy to criticize the form of the question or topic. This could lead to discussions between the two of us when doing interviews. It seemed that he was able to take some of my more complicated and academic question down to a level that made it possible for the respondents to answer them. My husband knew well what I was doing research on and he had been very interested in the political developments in Somaliland the last ten years. He also understood the Norwegian culture well after 16 years in Norway and had a certain idea of what needed to be explained. This interaction and correction was made possible because we were on much more equal terms than one usual is with a translator that you hardly know and that does not have any prior knowledge of the topic you are trying to get knowledge about. But it does also create a situation where the translator gets much more of a say in what you choose or are even allowed to ask about. We sometimes ended up using valuable time discussing if the question was good, appropriate or even possible to ask.

I did twenty interviews (one with two informants together) during my stay in Somaliland most of them in the capital, Hargeysa, two in Berbera and one in Sheikh. In addition to this numerous informal conversations and discussions with people that I met during my stay has influenced my interpretation of my data as did keeping up with the local newspapers. Three were from the Guurti and three from the House of Representatives. The informants within the two houses came from different clans. I interviewed one minister in the sitting government, three officials appointed by the president who all were mayors of major towns in Somaliland, three of the informants were politically active men currently outside of the system where one was the founder of one of the new political parties in Somaliland. In addition to this I interviewed five persons who had knowledge of Somali culture, the clan

system, prior conflicts and administration. I tried to be conscious about getting my informants from different clans but I did not make clan the deciding criteria. This choice was made from the assumption that clan is not the most important factor in a relatively stable political environment and the assumption that clan has been misinterpreted as the most important explanatory factor in prior analyses of Somali political strategies. This will be explained and argued for further in a later chapter.

I interviewed representatives from the elite. The advantages are that they have excessive expertise and knowledge about the area you are interested in and they are able to give a good overview of the system that they are in. They can also formulate politics, history and future plans in a more articulate way (Marshall and Rossman 1995). This was an important factor when choosing to spread my interviews over a greater field than initially planned. The informants did have to function as key informants. The weakness in my study is that I did not get to interview or talk with most of the informants more than once. This made it impossible to for instance evaluate the first interview and by looking at the topics covered there find out if there were things that needed to be more elaborated or maybe there were topics that I had missed out on that should be dealt with. The question I have to ask myself is whether it is possible to make general statements on the basis of these interviews since I did not get to do more than one assessment of the information provided.

The drawback interviewing the elite is that it requires that the one doing the interview is able to demonstrate competence in the area of interest. The informant may also demand more active participation of the interviewer. There is also a danger that the informant may take charge of the interview and you will not get the information you need and instead be the subject of interest (Marshall and Rossman 1995). My experience was that most informants would use the first five minutes to ask about what I wanted from them. The fact that I dressed appropriately in a Somali and a Muslim perspective and brought my husband and child along to many interviews seemed to make most people let down their guards very fast and they would talk relatively freely. Only once did I experience that a respondent did not want me to take notes or tape the conversation. This was apparently the direct result of the fact that he was new in the job. He did not want to say something that could be considered “wrong” by the government still he had no problems with me using the information I got from him in my project.

My interviews took place in various settings. When you interview officials you often have to meet them at their work place. People that were outside of the system I usually invited to my house and they got tea, mineral water and simple serving like cookies. Some of the representatives I also met at their home or we went out for dinner in the evening and talked over dinner and after. Since I was a woman this would always be in restaurant were you sat outside at private tables sheltered from other customers so the informant could feel confident that the conversation would be of a more private character. The problem with these various settings was that they would never be entirely private. In my house there would always be people around including my three-year-old son that would demand attention from time to time and relatives from my husbands' family either permanent houseguests or visitors. Since I was talking to the elite one often needs to be introduced (Marshall and Rossman 1995) This meant that since I often met people only once the people that had been able to arrange for the meeting would be coming along. I got the impression that they expected to be allowed to be there. They had gotten the invitation and by being there they would be able to signal their own influence but they seldom took part in the conversations. This might have made some of my informants censor what they wanted to say. There seemed to be a rather healthy freedom of speech in Somaliland at the time being and few seemed shy about coming with information that would put their country's political situation in a bad light. But several of the incidents described by my informants and in the papers clearly indicated that people in position were also easily dismissed by sometimes random and inexplicable reasons and that my informants did take some risk in talking to me. This made me decide to make my respondents anonymous in the writing out of the data and also my main contact.

The interviews that took place in peoples offices seldom lasted for more than an hour. This meant that I did not always have the time to go deep into all the subjects that I wanted to. The consequence of this was that I had to focus each interview on certain areas that I would have decided on before I went there. In following interviews I would make sure that some of the themes from the preceding interviews would be covered and then I would move on to new themes. In this way I would try to find out whether the information gathered was reliable. The interviews not done in people's office hours lasted between one and two hours. This would depend on the language skills of the informant. If he spoke English I could manage without my husband's translation and I got more time to talk about the topics I had selected for the interview. When you use a translator a lot of time is lost translating. There

will always be one participant that is passive. The informants tended to be bored easier and you tend to finish up earlier. When the informant spoke English those who came along with me seemed to find it easier to leave me alone with the informant after a while and the interview lasted longer. The advantage of doing interviews at home was the same. The informants seemed more relaxed and less rushed by the informal atmosphere and even those who only spoke Somali and where translations were needed talked for a longer time.

Secondary Literature

Most research projects demand use of multiple sources. Many problems arise as you work and using multiple sources can help even out biases you build into your research and the fact that one sometimes haven't solved all the problems one ran into in the best way.

In my research I have included books written about the former Somalia/Somaliland, research articles, newspaper articles from the small and embryonic press that one finds in Somaliland, documents produced by various Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and various articles found on the Internet. The books and articles are from various fields, from political science, anthropology, sociology and so forth. The newspaper articles I have used are primarily about politics and the reports are related to the provision of social services and the rebuilding of infrastructure. The goal has been to get a broad understanding of the workings of the Somali society both present and past and to get information about selected areas from more than my interviews.

The most important thing to keep in mind when one uses other sources is that they are produced for other purposes than your own. It is important to understand this purpose because it will have consequences for the analyses you do (Robson 1993). To understand for instance the Somali political and social structures I have had to rely on I.M. Lewis who is a social anthropologist that has worked in the field since the early fifties. His research has been a corner stone in any research project on Somalis and their society. What I have found is that his focus is not necessarily biased but the common interpretation of his texts is in the sense that they focus mostly on conflict elements and segmentary forces in Somali relations. His research has come up with many insights about Somali structures. I have chosen to play down the "endemic" conflict element since I think that other literature that I use point out

that for instance conflict management is just as important and common a practice within the Somali clan structure.

Something else and related that was pointed out in another master thesis (Abdi 1996) was that much of the literature on Somalia has some sort of bias that is reflected in the writing. By this the author touched upon the fact that every text is a social construction and one needs to ask oneself certain question when using it. Who are the people behind the text and what motives do they have for writing what they do? This is true for both public documents and social science research texts. I have tried to get as broad a sample as possible of texts based from the geographical area in question, Somaliland.

Since I am writing about Somaliland I have collected data that can be said to build up under the notion of a Somaliland state as opposed to a Somali. This will by many members of the Somali community be regarded as a political choice. I have not focused on literature that treats the whole Somali community only parts of it. The differences between the northern and the southern Somalia are pronounced both due to colonial experiences and post colonial ones and my findings can not be said to relate to the whole of the former Somalia.

Some will say just by looking at my thesis and the title that it is pro-Somaliland and is built around invalid information and it is subversive in that it recognizes Somaliland as an entity and thereby undermines the existence of Somalia. My area of interest has been the former British protectorate Somaliland that coincides with today's Somaliland that is not recognized by any foreign nation or international organization. The information I have used is related to this geographical area. I find it hard to dismiss the governmental structures that are recognized in the press, by individuals and the newest literature. My main purpose for choosing the literature I have has been to enhance the reliability of my research. This means that much literature that is more relevant to the former Somalia and the south in particular has been omitted. This is not to reduce the significance of the former nation of Somalia or to dismiss that there can be a future to this country. The main task for me as a researcher then becomes to be critical to my sources and be specific about what my findings reflect and most important do not.

Concluding remarks

The purpose of this chapter has been to show how one as a researcher always enters the field with values, opinions and intentions and that these are formed by what you bring with you but also in how you are perceived, in my case an assumed understanding and sympathy towards the clan structure and the fact that I was considered one of them, a Somali by marriage. I have given a thorough description of my research design and discussed the weaknesses and strengths in my choice of method in order to achieve reliability which in a qualitative study is at best achieved by disclosing how the data are obtained and how you yourself influence the process.

Paths to present political formations in Somaliland

Introduction

In this chapter I will try to answer my first research question which is what the political strategies that led to the disintegration of Somalia were. I will be looking at the Somali inhabited area from the beginning of colonization and up to the time of my study. I have chosen to give an account of the “ideal” pastoral political strategies first in order to give an idea of how the Somalis have been able to co-exist in a hostile and scarce environment without any regulation by a central state and which largely functioned in pre-colonial time. Next I will outline the political idea of the Somali inhabited territories as an assumed culturally, religiously and linguistic homogenous area that constitutes a nation, so called pan-somalism. This can be considered an overarching political ideology that has been structuring politics within Somalia and the responses to external input like development and military aid, bordering conflicts and so forth. Then I will outline the historical background of the formation of Somalia and their consequent politics during different political regime to identify the factors contributing to the disintegration. I will move on and give an account of the internal developments within today’s Somaliland up to the time of my study in order to show the integrating forces at play after the declaration of independence of Somaliland. Finally I will give a description of the system that was set up at the time of my field work in order to show how the system has built in conflict solving responsibilities and intentions of power sharing and both horizontal and vertical integration.

The Pastoral Democracy

The first one to use this term about the Somali political culture was Ioan M. Lewis and some of the politicians I talked to also used the same term to describe the transitional state structure at the time of my field work. This is a powerful story that is used in order to link the traditional pastoral culture of the Somalis to modern day political strategies. Lewis has been the main source on Somali culture and society since the early sixties. He is an anthropologist and his writings have been a favored source in recent interpretations of

Somali conflicts. His initial labeling of the Somali pastoral society as in a constant state of feud and conflict has found its way to the media and conference tables. The disintegration of the Somali state has been attributed to their segmentary social structure and warring instincts, a way of interpreting the conflict that is not necessarily offering many solutions to the problems of the former Somalia. Lewis still offers a very good description of their conflict solving tools that counters this perception and he recognizes the main sources of conflict which is competition for scarce resources.

There are five elements in the Somali conflict solving traditions (Menkhaus 1999). The *diya paying group* is the lowest and most stable unit of the clan system. If a member of such a group cause material damage or is responsible for the death of someone of another clan the *diya* is responsible for economically compensating for the other clan's loss. The purpose of *diya* was to avoid longstanding conflicts and blood feud. This practice still exists among the Somalis. The *clan elders* are trusted members of their clan. They are responsible for negotiation in conflicts on behalf of their clan. The title is not hereditary although some families do get special significance in a clan. It is based on valued and necessary skills like being a good poet, skilled negotiator or for being a respected religious leader. The *xeer* is the social contract that existed among the Somalis on all levels and to some extent exists today. The *xeer* can be compared to the social contract that one finds discussed in political philosophy. It had to some extent integrated Islamic law, *Sharia* and was what you can call the custom law of the Somalis. Lewis' labeling of the political system as democratic rested on the conception of the institution of *xeer*. Somali culture is largely oral and the *xeer* consisted of a long line of unwritten rules of conduct assuring predictability and the possibility of negotiation and building of trust among the different clans. It also consisted of settlements between the various groups over time (Lewis 1988). *Shir* was the meeting of the elders where they consulted each other and negotiated agreements. It was relatively open and democratic as everybody was allowed to speak and this was where the clan's positions in a dispute were ratified. It was a consensus building process and all decisions taken at these meetings were legitimate and binding. The elders were always elected from their clan on the basis of consensus. They could legitimately represent their clan's interest at the *shir*. Rules of conduct assured that everyone did their best at reaching a settlement. This means that peaceful conflict solving has had a relatively fixed structure over time in the Somali culture.

For a settlement to come into action both parties must respect it. As there was no central authority to enforce it in pre-colonial Somali territories the fulfillment rested largely on the individual but first and foremost on the clan. If the accused refused to abide by the agreement his clansmen could force it into action by negotiating with him and sometimes let some of the burden rest on the *diya* paying group itself. The voluntary obligation to honor agreements reached were crucial in order for the system to function well. This system has been in play for a long time and in practice the clans themselves sanctioned and ratified the decisions that were reached by the *shir*. If a conflict escalated into violence there were strict rules. Women, children and old people were to be spared and for instance the rapes that begun to take place during the Siyad Barre regime to humiliate and destroy Isaq families are both unacceptable and prohibited by the *xeer*. Somali history is a history of a nomadic population competing for scarce resources but the *xeer* gave predictability and rules to live by. This means that the portrayal of Somalia and Somali political culture as violent and erratic is rather biased. The Somalis have for a long time shared a common notion of how to deal with conflicts and their practice has largely respected this. There are no records of conflicts of the magnitude that followed in the aftermath of the Barre regime in Somali history which means that it is not entirely correct to assume that the problem of modern day conflicts in Somalia lies solely in the clan structure and that this is the appendicitis of Somalia. The pastoral democracy as a political idea represents the “high culture” of the Somalis and has substantial support within the elite at least. The clan structure as a part of this is a strong and lasting social structure among the Somalis which is easy accessible to promote singular as well as collective interests and this has had subsequent consequences for how any Somali politics has played out since it is a strong and effective structure that has been seen as legitimate and even necessary in order to both survive and coexist with both other clans and other ethnic groups in the area.

Somalia

Pan-Somalism

Pan-Somalism seems to have its origin in the Dervish fights from the end of the eighteenth century that ended in 1920. Sayid Mohamed Abdille Hassan, the Mad Mullah of Somaliland was the founder of this movement. He belonged to one of many Islamic religious

brotherhoods that in a Somali context were revived from quite early in the eighteenth century (Samatar 1988). They were established structures that could transform into more political organization. They had a strict structure of absolute leadership and as colonialism started to penetrate into the nomad's domain the brotherhoods rejuvenated the idea of *jihad*, holy war to protect their communities. The Dervish struggle began as a war against the Ethiopians that had invaded traditional Somali territory in the Haud in order to feed its huge army in their colonizing efforts in the whole of the Horn. Over time the Mullah allied himself with other clans within today's Somalia and it became the first real struggle between the colonialists/non-Somalis and the Somalis and it manifested the belief in a common Somali identity for the first time.

Besides Somalia consisting of the British Protectorate and the Italian colony in the south the Somalis inhabit three other territories: the Northern Frontier District of Kenya to the south, the Ogaden in Ethiopia to the east and Djibouti to the north-west. The Northern Frontier District of Kenya did not see any Somali nationalism before 1960 because the territory was heavily controlled and the most remote and underdeveloped in Kenya. More than half of the population consisted of Somalis, mostly settled in the eastern parts. As it turned out, the British government in fear of provoking conflict with Ethiopia and France who also had their Somali issues to resolve finally decided to leave a possible uniting of Somali occupied territories to the new post-colonial governments of Somalia and Kenya. A commission stated that the Somalis and the Muslim population in the area would prefer to be united with the Somali Republic but that this could not take place before Kenyan independence. This in turn resulted in Kenyan nationalism winning over the Somalis hope that this would be an issue between the British and Somali government. The relationship between the British and the Somali Republic was severely damaged and diplomatic relations broken abruptly off when the Somali nationalist realized that the issue would have to be solved without the British support for unification. The Somali cause was seen as being contrary to the colonial struggle towards independence and no one was willing to define neither Ethiopia who claimed Ogaden nor Kenya as colonizers and what little support the Somali cause got never seemed to amount to any strength to be reckoned with. The rule seemed to be that the borders of the colonial era was to stand as a possible balkanization of Africa was quite foreseeable since most colonial entities cut across areas inhabited by the same ethnic groups and most colonies were inhabited by several different ethnic groups and reorganization seemed impossible without conflict.

The French colonizer did not want to lose its control over the Djibouti harbor and sought to control the territory in a totally different way after independence than the former colonial powers of Somalia (Laitin and Samatar 1988). In order to weaken the influence of the Somalis in French Somaliland political measures were taken in order to strengthen the Afar who were an equally large group in the territory but not necessarily against unification with Somalia. The fact that the Ethiopians depended on the Djibouti harbor for supplies made both Ethiopia and France work against unification with Somalia. In addition Ethiopia was in a dispute over legal boundaries between Ogaden and Somalia. The Ethiopians never accepted the claim of giving back the Haud part of Ogaden and in large suppressed the Somali population of the area. Somali nationalism was banned and the government demanded that Somali political aspirations were to be expressed in Amharic. The area was underdeveloped in terms of education and medical services and there was nothing that indicated a possible reunion with Somalia. When independence arrived only the Italian colony and the British Protectorate were to join.

The Dervish war has taken on mythical proportions within Somali history and it is there it's strength lies as the accomplishments of the struggle are to be questioned since the structure of the organization was in no way democratic in the way the pastoral structure was and their goal was often not understood as looting of other herds was a way of life in the pastoral communities and the Mullahs alliances were not entirely understood or easy to anticipate (Samatar 1988). Modern-day pan-somalism is an overarching nationalistic idea that searches to build a bridge between the Somali communities that until independence functioned as independent and egalitarian clans occupying overlapping territories with no central authority regulating the distribution of wealth. This idea of one nation without a state has structured Somali politics since before independence in all territories inhabited by the Somalis and is still influencing what political solutions that are seen as wanted and possible in solving the problem of the failed state; Somalia.

Independence and Civilian Rule

What is known as Somalia today consisted of two different territories managed by two different colonial powers before independence. Somaliland was a British protectorate from 1886 to 1961 and the rest of Somalia was an Italian colony from 1889 to 1961 only interrupted by British rule for ten years from 1941 to 1949 when it once again was turned

over to the Italians as a UN trust territory. The decision of a union between the two territories was reached at a conference in Mogadishu the spring of 1960. The two territories legislative bodies set up under the preparation for independence were to merge into a new National Assembly responsible for electing a new president (Contini 1969). The two territories were united 1st July 1960 and the unification of two territories populated by the Somalis became a reality and so the state known today as Somalia.

The Somalis organized according to more than clan at independence (Lewis 2002). If one looks to Samatar's (1989) analyses of the rural transformation in Northern Somalia he points to the formation of an urban petty bourgeoisie as the Somali territory was penetrated by traders of Asian and Middle Eastern decent and the colonial powers increasing both export of livestock and the import of commodities. The vivid trade and the integration into the regional economy in turn made it possible for an unproductive urban elite consisting of amongst others the middlemen in the livestock business to strengthen. They benefited from the rural production without having to develop the production forces itself (Samatar 1988). A small group of educated elite also existed at the dawn of independence and with the strengthening of the urban economy a new class of traders emerged and these groups combined with traditional clan leaders formed the political forces of what was to become Somalia.

The Somalis organization into clans was an issue before independence as well as after (Lewis 2002). The political elite felt that the divisive nature of their clan system in part was responsible for the partition of the Somali territory in the past between different colonial powers (Laitin and Samatar 1987). The Somali Youth League formation was a direct response to the fact that Britain at the end of World War Two controlled four out of five Somali territories which gave rise to renewed pan-Somali nationalism. The political parties that were present at liberation did not represent clans per se but no doubt did those who wanted a position use his clan in order to gather popular support and the political parties were also dominated by certain clans. The largest party of the first ten years of post-colonial democracy was the Somali Youth League and it was dominated by the Majerteen which belongs to the Darod. In the elite clan affiliation publicly stated were seen as a threat to building national unity and they referred to clan as a problem of the past and their clan in terms of their ex-clan. Even though the political elite renounced the clan structure it still was

the dominating structure in the whole of society and a structure necessary to take advantage of in order to gain political positions in the new democracy.

The new state had a meager financial base due to poorly developed production forces. This was mainly due to its position on the Horn of Africa in a hostile environment being detrimental in creating a growing and diverse economy. The decentralized and stateless pastoral mode of production was well adapted to these circumstances but certainly had its limitation as the region was more and more integrated in the surrounding economies. When Somalia gained statehood they depended on loans and grants from the outside world from day one. In order to secure funds Somalia joined diverse international organizations like the International Monetary Fund, the Organization of African Unity and became associates of the European Economic Community attracting foreign loans and aid amounting to well over \$100 million (Samatar 1988). China caught interest in the new state as well but it was Russia that came to the rescue. Somalia attracted military aid from Russia worth of £11 millions in 1963 alienating themselves from their surrounding states (Lewis 2002). The West and the US in particular was trying to be cautious not to support the Somali irredentist aspirations to unite all territories inhabited by Somalis. This was also integrated into the constitution of the Republic and the five points of the star in the Somali flag represent the five Somali territories (Laitin et al 1988). The result of the Russian military support was tension in the whole region as the West and the US resented Russia getting influence and intervening in what they saw as the liberation of Africa (Samatar 1988). The next decades saw shifts in alliances between the Communist world and the US that in large guaranteed an input of money and arms in the Somali state apparatus quite remarkable for the region. This Cold War competition over time contributed to a militarization of Somalia unique in an African context and it also filled the treasury of a dependent state. Thus the state became the sole arena of competition for resources and being in position secured access to both symbolic and material power, moreover mobilizing one's clan became means to this end, more over mobilization one's clan networks the means to get there.

Democratic elections prevailed through the first decade of independence and funding from the outside kept motivation and interest for gaining office high. A strong opposition was created during the first democratic period due to dissatisfaction with the distribution of seats between the regions which ultimately also corresponds to the distribution of different clans (Lewis 2002). In both the 1964 and the 1969 election many of the candidates switched party

after the election and joined the Somali Youth League. The result was most striking at the last election where the number of candidates reached over 1000, the number of parties 64. Once the parliament filled up all candidates joined the winning party leaving only one man in opposition. The main motivation joining the winning party was to be able to share the spoils of the post-colonial state and regain what they had spent on campaigning (Samatar 1988).

The civil governments of the early republic had few economic strategies in order to develop the country as a whole (Samatar 1988). The years between the first and second election were spent trying to integrate the two territories with totally different colonial experience and therefore totally different ways of organizing the state apparatuses. The two territories had different administrative languages, English in the north and Italian in the south. Whereas the Italian territory was administered with firm and oppressive measures disrupting existing power structures the north had been laxly administered by the British government. They had no other interest in the territory than to secure live stock supplies getting out and governed through indirect rule that granted power to the indigenous elite (Lewis 2002). The civilian regime was unable to agree upon a script for the Somali language which could have settled the problem of a common language. The two bureaucracy were totally different, where as the Italians had a large bureaucracy where corruption flourished and the pay was low, the north were organized in a much more lean structure founded on British ideals of autonomy and the rule of law. The pay for a job in the bureaucracy was significantly higher in the north. Being unable to agree on a common script of the Somali language integration seemed to be difficult and the differences between the north and the south in both bureaucracy procedures, laws, pay and language gave rise to grievances put forward both from southern and northern elites.

The two colonies had radically different colonial experiences that they brought with them into the union. The Italian part of the territory had seen some development in productive forces during its years as an Italian colony due to the fact that Italy had a much more aggressive colonial policy than the British. Italy's interest in African colonies was to gain overseas areas that could absorb some of the overpopulation in Italy and a need for overseas markets. The Italians had a strong military presence in the Somali territory and trained an army consisting of Somalis, Eritreans and Arabs teaching them Italian with the aim to suppress any resistance against Italian dominance (Samatar 1988). The Italians took over the

most productive agricultural land and enslaved the former owners. Infrastructure like irrigation systems, roads and refineries to support the new production of cash crops like bananas, cotton, sugarcane and castor beans were built. The British had little interest in developing the Protectorate and the development of social infrastructure and physical infrastructure was only undertaken if it was necessary in order to sustain the degree of control deemed necessary. In general any development efforts made by the civilian government after independence were perceived to be focused in urban areas and in the embryonic industrial sector which predominantly was placed in the south. The majority of Somalis were in the pastoral economy and the government did nothing more than the colonial powers had done. Taxes were imposed on livestock and commodities and little was done to improve the conditions for the pastoral population when it came to social infrastructure, veterinary services and trying to regulate and control deteriorating environmental conditions. Changes caused by overgrazing and changes brought to the pastoral mode of production due to both political integration and economic integration with the surrounding states and the world economy over time. The rural areas lost to the urban areas and the north to the south. The elite in the north was already feeling alienated by the new state.

The M. Siyad Barre regime

1969 saw the end of civilian rule in Somalia when the military forces lead by general M. Siyaad Barre seized power in a peaceful coup (Lewis 2002). The new military regime set out with bold and promising statements of what they wanted to accomplish. What was coined scientific socialism was launched as the political ideology of the new regime (Samatar 1988). And a maoist personal cult around Barre also was launched by the regime. The new leaders' agenda was manifold. Everyone should have the right to work, the productive forces was to be developed in order to bring progress to the country, a national script and a literacy campaign to be issued, tribalism highly associated with the exploitation of the state and it's resources was to be abolished and likewise state corruption and mal practice in state apparatuses were to end. Political parties were banned and elections would be held at an appropriate time in the future. A war on corruption started and the income gap between the elite and ordinary people were reduced in order to create more equality

The military regime decided to use the Latin script for the Somali language and thus solved a problem that the civilian governments had not been able to solve (Laitin et al 1988). The final decision on a common Somali script is maybe in fact one of the biggest accomplishments of the military regime as it made integration between different segments of the elite possible and with increased literacy social mobility should rise too. It finally made it foreseeable to integrate fully the two former colonies that had joined forces in 1969.

There was little resistance at this point in time as there was discontent within the ruling classes with the civilian governments lacking ability to bring prosperity and development to larger segments of the population and to the whole of the territory (Samatar 1988). The pastoral and mainly rural population did not show resistance at this point, this might be due to the fact that despite the deteriorating conditions for the rural population widespread illiteracy, slow communications, poor infrastructure and the fact that the clan functioned as a security net meant that they did not see any need or way to come forward with their grievances. The elite in fact also kept their links to the rural areas in the sense that their clansmen would approach them for employment possibilities and they also upheld economic ties by keeping profitable livestock with their rural clansmen. Thus the discontent mainly originated from the urban elite that were dissatisfied with their proportion of the spoils from the post colonial state (Samatar 1988). The military forces seemed to be the only part of the petty bourgeoisie that had not been torn by internal conflict due to the fact that they had concentrated on the pan-Somali cause defending the borders towards Ethiopia during the first years of the civilian rule. As the politics of the civilian government changed and they were left with little to do than to observe the mismanagement of the state they chose to act. At that point they were the only group within the state able to pull in the same direction.

Even though the regime set out to improve conditions in the rural sector their achievements were meager. The sugar industry and the production of electricity were nationalized (Samatar 1988). The two largest sectors, export of livestock and bananas were not nationalized. A mix of strict state control and free enterprise continued to be the rule as the new regime tried to get control over the productive forces. Since the pastoral economy was profitable already it was the agricultural sector that was to be restructured. Whereas thirty per cent of the civilian government's budget went to the industrial sector the military regime turned this around and put thirty per cent in the rural sector. Still the result was not impressive. In agriculture they set out to form communal farms organized in various ways. It

turned out to be difficult to create any surplus in this way of structuring production. It was alien to the farmers that did not put in the hours they were supposed to on communal land. Fisheries has never been favored among the pastoralists but a draught in 1974-75 lead the government to resettle 15 000 nomads by the coast and in cooperation with Russia built up the industry. Still productivity fell sharply towards the eighties as the nomads that had been resettled saw possibilities to go back into livestock as conditions once again got favorable. Over time there was a decline in all sectors. Even though prizes on live stock soared productivity did not. This was also the sector the state invested least money in and where they still took out the most money. Due to the fact that little was done to control this sector the middle men became even more powerful. The new regime thus failed in creating the conditions necessary in order for people to engage in economic networks that did not originate from within their own clan. People were still dependent on their clan in order to survive and the clan never lost its importance in the way the regime intended.

During the first period of the Barre regime there was little change in the distribution of clans in state organs on the highest level, the Darod still dominated but from being Majerteen dominated the clans of the general and his immediate family were gaining influence over others. Barre himself was a Marehan, his mother Ogaden and his son-in-law Dhulbahante, this power constellation popularized in the abbreviation MOD (Laitin et al 1988). The regime was oppressive of public opinions and people talked in code of what they saw as favoritism of certain clans. Samatar (1988) seems to think that clan did not matter much in the distribution of positions as does the more traditional scholars on Somalis like Lewis (2002) and Laitin and Samatar (1988). Nevertheless the clan issue prevailed within the state all through the seventies and never seized to be addressed in the way that grievances towards government policies were often articulated as clan grievances. What is safe to say is that to take clan identities to be primordial constructions and segmentary in nature is a simplification of the realities. What is true is that clan was and is a vital part of the social grid in Somali communities on all levels and that it could and most likely was the most common vehicle to climb socially, gain influence and exert political control. The economic development that could have weakened this network of patrimonial distribution never took place, either because the government policies were misguided or because the elite did not see it fit to actually enforce real policies of redistribution. The networks of clan were gaining importance instead of loosing it and thus prepared the ground for exclusion of those not influential or important enough to be integrated. In this environment a further politicizing of

clan occurred both in order for the state to be able to stay in control and those excluded to possibly get access to the sole source of profit, the dependent state milking its geopolitical position to a maximum.

The Ogaden War

Pan-Somali aspirations came to a peak again in 1977 (Laitin and Samatar 1988). Haile Selassie's regime had crumbled in 1974 and there was radicalization in Ethiopian politics that led to internal disintegration. In this environment the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSL), a nationalistic separatist movement also was founded with the goal to liberate the Somalis of the Ogaden from Ethiopian rule and join Somalia. The radicalization in Ethiopian politics made the US withdraw its support and the communist world with Soviet and Cuba in front moved in as the regime confessed to a Marxist ideology (Samatar 1988). This created unrest in Somalia that no longer felt sure that their borders with Ethiopia would not be even further pushed. During 1977 Barre had to let large parts of the country's army "resign" in order to join the liberation war in the Ogaden. The Ogaden clan was a vital part of Barre's tribal coalition in order to secure power during the 70s as it was his maternal clan. The Ogaden was also the only area that it seemed possible to get control over of the five Somali territories and also the most important economically since part of the Ogaden is the Haud that is a common grazing area for both the Isaaq of the north and the dictator's own clan, the Darod in the south.

The Somali leadership wanted to secure military support from the US when realizing that the Soviets were not going to support their irredentism (Samatar 1988). The US was alarmed by the Ethiopians calling the fighting in the Ogaden a Somali invasion and reconsidered, withdrawing any promised support, probably afraid they could get into a long lasting conflict impossible to get out of. The Arab world refused to give any support as long as they did not put an end to Soviet military presence within Somalia. At the end of the year all military personnel were asked to leave. The equipment and the troops were transferred to the Ethiopian side and in early 1978 the Barre regime announced publicly that they had entered the conflict even though most of their troops had joined their Somali brothers in Ogaden the year before (Laitin and Samatar 1988)) and the rest of the region already had defined the war as an invasion and not a liberation war (Samatar 1988). Only three months later they were defeated. They had overestimated the willingness of the West to support their fight and had

no allies that could support them in their cause. The conflict had caused 25 000 casualties on the Somali side and the repressive nature of the regime became even more clear after the humiliating defeat in Ogaden. The refugee influx following the war due to the Ethiopian government's expulsion of Somalis further destabilized the regime. The country had no economy to support the large amount of refugees and tension rose between the local population and the refugees. Somalia was put under severe political, economic and environmental strain which the leadership seemed unable to handle. Barre shifted alliances with clans in order to secure his position only achieving resistance and the further mobilization of those alienated by the regime. Finally in 1980 Somalia officially became a patron of the US who due to the political developments in the Middle Eastern areas wanted to have a strong military presence in the area. This shift in alliances finally lead to the UN intervention that miserably failed in restoring peace and the disintegration along identifiable clan lines structured around the competition for economic gains continued. In this unstable environment the Somalis were even more dependent on their clan network, and a clan network that had been severely distorted by some twenty years of institutionalizing patrimonial distribution of spoils paired with a deteriorating economic environment tearing down social structures and inducing violence.

Somaliland

Somaliland, the British Protectorate reached independence a few days before the rest of Somalia and the legislative assembly passed a law of union between the two territories. This document was never signed by the south and therefore not binding there. An Act of Union was also produced by the south but laws only approved "in principle". It was only seven months later that a proper and common Act of Union with retroactive power came into place that was binding for the whole territory (Contini 1969). When the Somalis voted over the new constitution less than 100 000 of an estimated population of 650 000 in the Protectorat's showed up at the election and only fifty per cent voted for. The result was ignored as the population was a mere per cent of the total population of the new Somalia and the overwhelming yes in the south was taken as support for the new constitution (Lewis 2002).

The general consent over time was that it was not evident at the starting point of the new state that Moqadishu and the south should have precedence over the north. Both parts had

colonial legacies that made it conceivable that both Moqadishu and Hargeysa could become the new capital (Samatar 1988). The Isaaq population was dominant in the North but found them self reduced to guests in the south without much leverage or influence. The Barre regime favoritism of the clan of his father, mother and son-in-law, all Darod clans in order to keep order in the ranks made the northern elite lag behind even more both in real influence. From being a separate territory with its own administration the Somaliland elite were over time either forced to join the sitting regime or be administered or ignored by it. The loss of influence and access to the spoils that the post-colonial state could offer became more and more apparent and resistance grew strong during the eighties mainly within the Isaaq that were the largest clan in the north and that occupy most of the territory of the former British Protectorate.

The terrorization of the Isaaq population in the north started in the aftermath of the Ogaden war with Ethiopia in 1978-79. The Somali state armed and taught the Ogaden refugees in the border camps to use firearms in order to fight the Ethiopians to regain Ogaden (Lewis 2002, Human Rights Watch 1990). Many of the refugees were Darods that competed for the same grazing lands and wells as the Isaaq. The refugees evidently did not engage in any liberation fights but started to terrorize the Isaaq population in the area. The problem escalated and the Somali state seemed to have little interest in putting an end to the looting, murders and rapes that took place. The Isaaq counter action was to create and support an under group of the WSLF to counter the abuse from the Ogaden paramilitary groups. This did not come out well with the government that disarmed the group and moved them to a location in the interior outside of the area that was most heavily afflicted by the conflict. The population of the north was left to fend for themselves and discontent with the government and feeling of being inferior to the south grew even stronger. .

The refugees seemed to enjoy rights that the Isaaq population was deprived of. The health- and educational systems in the camps were seen as superior to that of the general population. The government confiscated land from the Isaaq and redistributed it to refugees that made money from selling it back to their rightful owners (Human Rights Watch 1990). The government also used the refugees to get economic aid from the world community as well as food aid. People claimed later that this food was sold on the open market for the state to profit on. The Isaaq were asked to help their “brothers” and in many state offices, the refugees found paid jobs. They earned far more than the local population something that

worsened the relationship between the two groups. In short, the government used the refugee population as information source on the local population and created a hostile environment that would ultimately lead to disintegration.

In a report made by the elders of the Isaaq several points were made. Under Siyad Barre the northern region had been severely neglected (Lewis 2002). The health and educational sector was not developed at all. There had been no building of new roads and the maintenance of public buildings was non-existing. While ten factories had been built in the south after 1969, the north had two, one started by the civilian governments prior to that date and the other a cement factory that was not yet finished. There had been no agricultural projects in the areas that practiced cultivation. There existed no plans for regulating the problem of overgrazing and the veterinary service was poor. This worried the elders since the racing of livestock for export was the regions main source of income.

At the same time new import laws were adopted. One needed licenses to import foreign goods and the state made its point by confiscating goods of the total value of US\$ 50 million at the port of Berbera where the region got most of its imported goods through (Human Rights Watch 1990). The import licenses could only be made in Mogadishu and there was a three month waiting period to get it. In the north the only goods they received license for was rice and only 22 permits were given. The former principle that had governed commercial activity was free enterprise and the new restriction prevented the region from importing necessary goods and added to the grievances they had towards the government.

When the two territories had merged in 1960 a large part of the commercial and educated elite in the north had moved to the south and the capital of Mogadishu to maximize their opportunities for getting a good job and making a profit (Laitin and Samatar 1988, Samatar 1988). In the early eighties, some of them returned back north and was shocked to learn of the sorry state the former capital of Somaliland was in. They started fund raising to build up the city hospital that lacked everything from electricity to bandages. Everyone involved in this was arrested accused of subversive activity. The upcoming trial had to be postponed once because of a student riot against it. The rumor had it that some would receive the death penalty (Human Rights Watch 1990). They were all convicted to sentences ranging from ten years to life in prison. The trial was based on the testimony of a WSLF member that evidently had fled the country before the trials started.

In 1988 Barre entered a treaty with Ethiopia's Mengistu that they would not support the other country's rebel movements by allowing them to operate on the other state's soil (Lewis 2002). As a direct result, the spring of 1988 the Somali National Movement (SNM) founded in the Diaspora in the eighties went into Somaliland as they were expelled from Ethiopia where they had built up their organization in the region, and the civil war started. The organization was mobilizing the Isaaqs, the largest clan in Somaliland and mainly drew their economic support from the Diaspora population. Since they did not appear to have ties to the former regimes and the elite coalitions within Somalia they had considerable legitimacy in the population. The peace agreement between Siyad Barre and the Ethiopian government had left them no choice other than to leave Ethiopia where they were now unwanted and to start the liberation war of Somalia.

The government soldier's retaliation was brutal. The civilian population became their target. People were summarily shot in the streets, in their shops and homes and property were severely damaged. Both Hargeysa and Buroc were bombed by government planes while the terrified population fled (Africa Watch Report 1990). Houses and roads were practically demolished. The government encouraged the non-Isaaq population to leave and mass arresting of male Isaaqs started. Many were killed and mass graves are found through out Somaliland today. The government forces was driven out of the region by 1991

State Formation and Peace Negotiation

The independence of the Republic of Somaliland was declared on May 18th 1991 in Buroc when the SNM met with the Somaliland Council of elders that was created a few years prior to this. There had been no plans of declaring independence at the outset of the civil war but some parts of the SNM and the elders seemed to be determined to make sure that the country would never suffer from the kind of destruction and repression that the Siyad Barre regime had been responsible for again (UNDP/EUE 1994). The unilateral declaration of a national government in the south formed by the United Somali Congress tipped the scale. The SNM was not consulted and neither were any of the other liberation movements. People gathered around the building where the meeting was held and demanded that the territory seceded from the rest of Somalia. Some of my informants seemed to be of the opinion that the declaration of independence was premature and that the meeting in Buroc was cōupé by the

more radical segments of the SNM called the "Red Flags" and that the decision might not have been what all the participants wanted.

The SNM over time developed into a multi clan organization (Fox 2000). The organization had a more democratic organizational structure than many other rebel organizations; they had regular elections for leader and the leadership rotated between the different clans. This did not prevent the conflicts that less than a year after secession started to destroy the country from within. Internal clan conflicts that resulted in internal civil wars occurred in 1992-93 and in 1994-95.

Fighting broke out in 1992 between two Isaaq clans in Buroc and spread to Sheikh and Berbera (Menkhaus 1999). Berbera is the only port in Somaliland and was the major source of revenue for the government and became the biggest bone of contention. Much of the fighting was over commercially valuable land in order to secure the groups chances of getting their share of the economic upsurge that stability had brought. The conflicts had both recent and historical origins. The infant nation was moving towards anarchy again over material causes.

These developments lead to a long line of peace conferences held in all the major towns in Somaliland initiated by the clan elders (Menkhaus 1999).. The peace conferences in Somaliland in 1993 and in 1995 bore close resemblance to the traditional ways of solving conflicts among the Somalis. Elders with the confidence of their local communities met to resolve and reconcile the conflicting communities.

The conferences were different from others held and sponsored by the international community (Menkhaus 1999).. The conferences of Somaliland received little or no international funding and they lasted for a longer period of time. They were also held inside of the country. The elders stressed the importance of giving the warring parties a chance to meet and discuss their problems but also give them the opportunity to let the hatred and anger cool down so that it would be possible to reach binding and agreed upon solutions. For the most part the meetings dealt with material issues; loss of private property and use of communal assets like grazing land and wells. In areas of mixed clan population security committees were created to oversee that the agreements reached were fulfilled and to monitor the development and go in and negotiate where peace and stability was threatened.

The smaller conferences gave regional settlements and culminated in a national conference in Borame from February to May 1993.

The Constitutional System in Somaliland

The first version of the constitution that was in place at the time of the field work was adopted in 1993 at the Borame peace conference (Lewis 2002). A second version of the constitution was adopted by the national conference that was held in Hargeysa in 1997. This constitution was to function over a transitional period of three years and then be finally adopted after a national referendum was held. This transitional period was extended with a year in 1999 and another six months in February 2001. The referendum was held May 31st in 2001 where the people voted yes to the constitution. There have been prior documents like the treaties signed with the British government by different Somaliland communities during colonial time to regulate the relations between the colonial parties and the Somali communities that outline rights and responsibilities. Before independence there were also different constitutional documents. After gaining independence in 1960 Somaliland did not adopt a constitution because they were working towards the unification of all the Somali territories. Their independence lasted for a few days before they were unified with the South, the former Italian protectorate. In a referendum in 1961 Somaliland rejected the constitution adopted by the new state of Somalia.

The transitional structure of the Somaliland state was based on the common democratic principles of the separation of powers. They are to be further elaborated with Islamic law *sharia*. The state is organized into three branches. The parliament is the legislative branch of the state. It is divided into a House of Representatives and a House of Elders. There is a presidential executive power which consists of the president, the vice president and a council of ministers appointed by the president. Finally there is a judicial branch consisting of a supreme court, regional appeal courts, regional courts, district courts and the courts of the national armed forces. In addition there is a Procuracy with extended responsibilities that I will get back to later.

The system at the time of my field work recognized the authority of the elders and the *shir*. The *Guurti* manifested the *shir*, the national assembly of elders selected by their communities that was incorporated in the constitution and became the upper chamber of the

legislative branch. They were responsible for safeguarding peace. All clans should be represented and according to perception of relative strength. The *Guurti* consists of 82 members. Those in the house at the time of my research were elected as regional representatives but also as members of their own clan during peace negotiations in 1993. The members of the *Guurti* are elected as members of their clan and the distribution of the members is according to a key based on clan first and region second. They are elected for six years at a time. They further have to be older than 45 and they should have good knowledge of religion and be well versed in tradition. The traditional elder in the Somali community are often thought of as Men of Peace and they are either religious men or have other special skills like being good negotiators, poets or knowing the oral tradition of their clan well. These are the same qualities that are singled out in the constitutional system that is set up

The foremost responsibility of the *Guurti* today is to uphold peace and security. Somaliland's current stability was achieved largely through the initiative of traditional elders in the Somaliland community and they were also responsible for maintaining some sort of order in the chaos that the civil war brought upon the country. Another central responsibility is to review the laws passed by the House of Representatives before they are passed on to the president and they have special responsibilities regarding the passing of laws pertaining religion and culture. They may propose bills of their own and pass on to the House of Representatives but if it is not accepted there it cannot be referred back and then be voted over again at a later time. They have no say in bills that are related to finances but have considerable powers to delay the passing of other laws but no veto right as the House of Representatives do over bills coming from the *Guurti*.

The House of Representatives is the "democratic" element in the set up and their number equals that in the House of elders, eighty-three. The members today were elected during the same process as the elders and according to clan. In the future it is supposed to be held democratic elections and the representatives will be elected as members of political parties. Their lowest education of the members of the House of Representatives should be secondary school and one is not allowed to hold other public office for this period of time. They are elected for five years and must be no less than thirty-five years. The house is in session for twenty-eight weeks a year and the same goes for the House of elders.

Their duties are amongst others to confirm appointments of ministers, head of organs and so on. They also ratify international agreements. They also debate and can refer back the governments program and suggest and recommend the political direction of the governments program. Any member of government must meet to explain their action if summoned by the house. They have control over financial legislation regarding taxes and duties for raising income, the establishment of income funds, currency regulations and regulation of the economic and financial system. They are responsible for the approval the national budget. The president can dissolve the House after the approval of a national referendum or for failing to hold session for two periods. It is not possible to dissolve the House during its first year of office or in the presidents last year of office. The same rules of dissolution apply to the House of Elders.

The executive branch consists of the president, the vice-president and a council of ministers appointed by the president. The president and vice-president must be a Somaliland citizen by birth and cannot have another citizenship or be a refugee in another country. He must have lived in the country two years prior to the scheduled election and be aware of the country's situation. He is required to be a Muslim and so is his spouse. Both are elected in direct election through secret ballot. The winner of the election is the candidate with most votes and the term of office is five years and can sit a maximum of two periods. The House of Elders is able to extend the term of the sitting president, which is five years if they find that the security situation in the country makes it difficult to carry out elections. If the president is unable to fulfill his duties during his office the Vice president takes his place for the rest of the term and has to elect a Vice President from the House of Representatives that the two houses has to confirm. The same happens if the vice president cannot fulfill his duties. In the case of both being unable to fulfill their duties the Speaker of the House of Elders assumes office and elections are to be held within sixty days.

The president appoints the head of the different state organs like the Auditor General, Chairman of the central bank, chairman and committee members of the Civil Service Agency, commanders of the armed forces and their deputies, Chief Accountant and so on. He signs international agreements and treaties and participates in international conferences on behalf of The Republic of Somaliland, he appoints ambassadors to other countries and meet foreign diplomats. He may also proclaim state emergency. He also appoints ministers and the requirements for the ministers are the same as those for the House of Representative.

The president's appointment has to be approved by absolute majority (half of the total members plus one) by the House of Representatives.

The judicial branch adjudicates proceedings between state organs and between members of the public. They interpret the laws and are responsible for the prosecution services of the country. They are supposed to be independent of the other branches. The judiciary consists in addition to the different courts of a special organ called the Procuracy and their task is to oversee civil suits on behalf of the government and inspect the prison system. The Attorney General is the head of this office and this is if one looks closer at it actually a part of the executive. A special state organ that also should be mentioned is the *Uleema* that is a council consisting of Muslim scholars and they are responsible for overseeing that the laws passed are not in conflict with *sharia* and they formulate official declarations in cases of religious disputes.

The country is divided in regions and these are divided into districts. They are to be administered through councils, region, districts and village, and that have power to plan their own economic and social affairs. The head of the region is to be appointed by the president and is the state's representative. These councils are in office for five years. The different regions of the country have rules for who can be the governor. The main rule is that a numerical dominant clan cannot have the highest political position.

The constitution also address basic individual rights like the right to participate politically, economically, socially and culturally in the countries affairs. There is a freedom of movement and freedom of association unless it is seen as threatening to the state. There is no limitation period on violation on human rights such as torture, extra judicial killings and mutilation. Any arrest should be reasoned and the state should guarantee every citizens freedom. If arrested you are to be put in front of a court within forty eight hours. One is innocent until proven guilty and only the offender is held liable to any crime. This is a very important clause since in the traditional system of *xeer* liability is often is distributed upon the *diya* paying group as a whole. Imprisonment is seen as a possibility for reform and rehabilitation.

The constitutional system of Somaliland is rather straight forward and resembles systems all over the world. The system in play at the time of my field work differs a bit from what is laid down in the constitution. There are for instance not functional regional councils everywhere.

This is according to one respondent because there has not been held any elections yet. This means that more traditional structures of elders and *sultans* and *aqils* which are more hereditary titles come into play if conflicts arise. This means that there are ways of organizing in order to address central government if necessary as the new system hopefully moves toward maturity.

The system is in its structure based on western liberal democracy; the representation is indirect and based on a fixed ratio between different clans with a consociational aim of integrating all elites and to reduce and solve conflicts. The system seeks to give all groups the right and possibility to participate in the reconstruction of Somaliland. The intention of the system is integration but the reality of the system might be something else. The mixing of *xeer*, *sharia* and more modern legal practices is quite complicated and admittedly leads to conflict as it is more modern legal practices that are given priority as such in the system but in times of conflict *xeer* has been used. Another issue is if this set-up is really able to counter the patrimonialistic political culture taking advantage of the clan structure that were basically institutionalized over the years beginning with the early colonization of the territory. Somalis have experienced several different ways of governing but none of them have been able to bring democracy and redistribution to the general population and it is questionable if the mere set-up in it self would be able to promote it now. Economic constraints have always structured the Somali state's ability to integrate groups both horizontally and vertically and this is likely to continue.

Concluding remarks

In order to understand Somali politics and political formations after the collapse of Somalia in 1987 it is necessary to look at former political strategies in the Somali inhabited area. Political strategies over time can be said to create an environment for cooperation or conflict and political strategies after the state collapse can be seen as a continuation or a break with former politics. Politics are structured around common ideas and values and in addition the economic base of the state will determine to what degree the state succeeds in carrying out its policies. In Somalia nationalism has centered on the pan-Somali issue. The idea of a nation consisting of all the Somali speaking territories in the Horn of Africa can be said to have had a centripetal function in Somali politics since before independence. At the same

time it seems clear that the social structure of Somalia where the clan is the main source of redistribution of wealth has had some problematic consequences over time. Given the dependent character of the Somali state clan affiliations have been politicized and used in order to gain access to positions and resources. The lack of ability of the state to develop the productive forces has exacerbated this tendency towards state centered patrimonialism. The result over time has been segmentation due to the mal functioning of the state. Somali scholars seem to have different opinions about the importance of clan as a centrifugal force in Somali politics. Ahmed Samatar's analyses of Somali politics since before independence tones down the clan issue and puts more emphasis on general elite alliances and economic constraints. Lewis is amongst the traditionalist if it is possible to say that and gives clan affiliations and clan segmentation explanatory force. I choose to think that clan paired with economic dependency, regional political developments and Cold War rivalry that led to militarization actually does explain the disintegration of Somalia and that in any analyzes of the political strategies in Somalia the clan structure should be included. The consociational set up based on clan identities in Somaliland seeks to integrate both democratic and traditional elements in order to find a balance in political strategies that may promote stability and development and that have legitimacy in both the elite and the population.

Politics in Practice in Somaliland

In this chapter I will try to answer my second research question. In what way are the political strategies of the Somaliland elite promoting stability and political integration? In the previous chapter I looked at political strategies over time and in this I will look at the strategies chosen by the elite in the transitional system at work at the time of my fieldwork in 2001. I will look at if the elite see the system as a good tool for influencing politics and also look at how they perceive their own performance and other branches of government's performance. In this way I hope to be able to say something about whether the system is able to safeguard further stability, integrate the different groups and promote further reconstruction on all levels. I will also look at how civil society and the state are integrated and try to say something about the importance of group identity, namely clan in the relationship between civil society and state and in politics.

Elite consociationalism within the state

Here I will look at how the legislative and the executive talk about their own strategies and how they perceive their counterpart's strategies. First I will look at the relationship between the executive and the legislative then the relationship within the legislative, between the *Guurti* and the House of Representatives

The legislative and the executive branch

The respondents from the legislative were pointing to the fact that they were not able to check the powers of the executive in general and the president in particular the way intended by the constitution (interview March 22nd, April 24th and April 21st). In that way they saw the major conflicts between the legislative branch and the executive branch as being constitutional. At the time of my fieldwork their main influence was in budget cases. If they did not approve the state budget it was impossible for the government to spend any money. They were also working on the amendments of the constitution in order to prepare for the Referendum that was held May 31st 2001 in order to get popular approval of the constitution and support for the Republic of Somaliland.

An example of this was that the constitution states that the government should prepare a political program each year that states what policies they are committed to and how they plan to carry them out. This political program had not been delivered in a formal document by the government. The president refused to do this and argued that his yearly speech to the people was sufficient (Interview April 24th). This sentiment was not shared by parts of the House of Representative. The members of the House of Representatives that I interviewed considered this program very important (interview March 22nd, April 21st and April 24th). The president and his government were not elected on the basis of a political program which would be the case in a democratic system. They were nominated as members of clans and because they might have skills that were valued in a government position. The government's politics was described as undecided and weak towards important questions like international recognition and economic and social development throughout the country (Interview March 22nd, April 21st, April 24th). With no political program to hold the executive responsible for some representatives found it difficult to cooperate with them (Interview April 24th). Members of the executive on the other hand pointed to that many of the members of the House of Representatives were not qualified to do the job hence the conflicts that the legislative called constitutional and which the executive considered a result of that incompetence. The Representatives also saw the problem that some were not doing their job but maintained that there were competent and experienced representatives that had taken part in politics since the sixties and that this made it impossible to claim that dispute over the constitution were due to incompetence on behalf of the Representatives (Interview April 21st, April 24th).

When it came to the issue of a political program the House of Representatives had decided to accept the fact that the executive claimed that the yearly speech to the people was sufficient (Interview April 21st II, April 24th). They had no real leverage in order to make the president put forward a program. They still meant that it was unconstitutional behavior and not acceptable and the matter was debated both in the House of Representatives and the *Guurti*. They defended this strategy of no resistance by referring to the fact that they feared that a deep and open conflict could easily descend into the armed and dangerous conflicts they experienced in the early nineties (Interview April 21st II). It was also expressed that the system at the time was transitional and that meant that soon as a better system, the party system would be in place.

The set up with a bicameral system with a presidential executive and a clan based legislative intended to give the representatives a possibility to control the executive to quite some degree. This seemed not to be the case in Somaliland at the time of my fieldwork. The legislative chose a passive strategy of accepting what they saw as problematic lack of control with the politics of the executive. The executive on the other hand uses lack of experience in the legislative as their excuse to do things the way they see fit. The lack of putting forward a very detailed political program with more specified political goals made the executive flexible. To tie resources up in a program would make it hard to go in and negotiate when serious conflicts came around. No doubt the system depended on the fact that one was able to handle conflicts both by negotiation and in a more material way. In order to reach a settlement a material concession was assumed to be given too. The fact that all the representatives were nominated on basis of clan and were assumed to represent local communities did not seem to make the critique put forward by the representatives more legitimate or more important to address by the executive. By not allowing the legislative to influence their practice they were jeopardizing stability over time as the legislative had an important legitimizing function. Both branches of government seemed to know that their strategies were acceptable to a certain degree also because the system was considered transitional and that another system, hopefully better would be in place in a few years. This shows that the elite integration is considerable and enough to give predictability within the system but the disputes over how the constitution is to be interpreted and the fact that the legislative are unable to check the executive in the way prescribed by the constitution could be a future problem.

In order to create a more stable economic environment a new currency, the Somaliland shilling had been introduced during the presidency of the now late Ibrahim Egal (interview March 22nd). This was seen by the legislative as a good accomplishment. The Somali shilling had lost much of its value due to decades of war. It has been common practice that businessmen and head of militias got their own bills printed abroad. This had made the inflation high in the parts of the country where this currency was used. In the area that the Somaliland shilling had been introduced and the Somali shilling was taken out of circulation the inflation was fairly low. One problem pointed out by my respondents was that not the whole of Somaliland had switched to the Somaliland Shilling even though the use of the Somali Shilling was forbidden by law. The reason for not changing their money was apparently that they would have to bring their Somali shilling in exchange and they would

not get the total value of their money back in Somaliland Shilling. The government had tried to set an official exchange rate but this had not worked out. There are no banks in Somaliland only various firms which are active in a multitude of business areas like the *Hawala* banking system, soft drinks and telecommunications. Most of these businesses do their transaction in US dollars. Their customers take the dollars to the money exchangers on the corner for Somaliland Shilling and they get a better rate from them than the rate that the state has set. There were incidents where these money exchangers were arrested by the police for not following the official exchange rates but they were only gone for a limited period of time and continued their business when released. The state simply did not have the resources to control the money market or to make Somaliland Shilling the valid currency in all its territory.

Introducing a common currency was meant to have a stabilizing effect on the economy. The introduction of the Somaliland Shilling had made it possible to have a better control than if one had continued to use the Somali Shilling that was heavily influenced by the continuous fighting in the south and the lack of any state authority that could regulate inflation through various economic tools and where the private printing of bills still was a problem.

Monopolizing the printing of bill and issuing a separate bill for Somaliland both gave promises of a more stable market and created a sense of common identity. The heavy inflation associated with the Somali shilling had not occurred in Somaliland giving economic predictability to both businesses and people in general and thus promoting stability.

The government had also been able to disarm the militia groups of the country to a large extent. Those who used to be members of a militia group during the civil war could register to become a soldier or policeman (interview March 22nd, April 24th). They had to bring all their weapons and were trained by the government. According to some of my respondents and other people that I talked to during my stay the situation was different in different parts of Somaliland. The problem of militias creating check points at important roads and demanding money from travelers was probably not a problem in Somaliland any more. But many claimed that the presence of weapon in the streets still was a problem in some areas. Walking in the streets in the capital of Hargeysa you would only see the police or the president's security force carry weapon. During my three month stay I only heard a gun fired once and that was the police firing after a car after a hit and run incident. In downtown

Hargeysa the money exchangers would sit along the street with their Somaliland Shillings on the table ready to change US dollars and other regional currencies for you. They sat perfectly safe and you never heard of robberies. In e.g. Buroc one could still see technicals in the streets which were rebuilt cars designed to carry bigger firearms (interview April 6th) and there were reports of shooting between different groups when conflicts occurred.

Being able to absorb the militias is without doubt important in order to maintain stability. Historically Somalia was one of the most militarized countries in the world due to fierce Cold War competition during the whole post-colonial period. It was the degree of weapons available that partly contributed to the devastating effects of the state collapse. The claims and grievances put forward have been pushed by gun force and not peaceful means. In order for a state to be able to function and be legitimate in the sense that they can offer its citizens an acceptable degree of security, there is a need to monopolize the use of violence and being able to enforce law and order. In Somaliland one had achieved the goal, at least in the western part of the country and partly in the east. The degree of gun control in Somaliland seemed to be sufficient in order to be able to make the state's army and police force able to provide a degree of security that prevented and discouraged groups from forming militias and paramilitary organizations. The rehabilitation of militiamen was the only strategy for creating job opportunities for people in Somaliland. This effort was considered by many to be closely related to the enduring stability and it gave legitimacy to the executive.

What is clear is that Somaliland is vulnerable both to internal and external changes in political environment and this relative gun control would easily crumble in the wake of a conflict either with bordering areas within the former Somalia or conflicts with neighboring states, first and foremost Ethiopia. Another destabilizing factor could be the heightened fear of terrorism and the fact that the whole territory of Somalia is seen as a likely breeding ground for Islamic terrorist groups. Many informants that I talked to described of how the hardships brought upon the population through the successive conflicts from state collapse and to the time of my fieldwork also resulted in a radicalization of both religious and political groups but also a move in the population towards a more strict interpretation of religion and religious practice. The Somalis interpretation of Islam has been modified by the pastoral culture in the past and the carrying of full length *hijabs* were a recent phenomenon observed after the collapse of Somalia. Adherence to a much stricter way to interpret Islam

was a recent phenomenon too. International military intervention as a result of this will undoubtedly have serious implications for the areas that would be targeted.

There had been no other programs on the part of the government in order to create jobs. Unemployment in Somaliland was very high. No numbers of the magnitude of the problem existed but that more than half the adult male population was out of work is probably fair to say. The Representatives brought this up as a major area that the government had showed little interest for or will to do something about. It has been a problem of earlier regimes that they had not been able to satisfactorily create work opportunities that people benefited from and that increases productivity. This was especially one of the goals of the early Barre regime. What was achieved was either not working or it had biases towards geographical areas like the southern part of Somalia or an urban or even clan bias. It is unquestionable that the main source of income, export of livestock was not able to absorb the entire work force. The economy of the state was not of a magnitude that allowed them to go into this area and stimulate to the establishing of work opportunities. Urbanization is on the increase all over Africa and also in Somaliland. There is a large urban population that is unable to find work and thus be able to sustain themselves and their families. In Somaliland people are left to create their own work opportunities.

Both members of the House of Representatives and members of the executive branch were all aware of the problem of uneven development. Whereas the representatives saw this as a conscious strategy of negligence from the government's side the members of the executive accounted for it by pointing to lack of funding because of the lack of international recognition of the country which made it harder for them to control the activity of NGOs in the country since they were not seen as a formal state authority and proper bilateral partner by some actors (WSP International Somali Program 2005). The amputated income due to a long lasting ban on export of livestock also made the financial situation of the government difficult.

All of the Representatives pointed out that there was a problem of uneven allocation of funding by the state. The representative for one of the eastern regions said that the government was present to a very little degree in his region. The government spent little money and even contributed to the low share of international NGOs in the area. Up to 2001 the government had not discouraged NGOs to operate in the eastern part of Somaliland but

had stated that they could not take responsibility for people's security east of a certain area. A couple of representatives said that this had contributed to the uneven distribution of NGO projects in Somaliland. These NGO projects were vital in order to provide basic infrastructure as health care, schools and water in Somaliland. The area he comes from is partly disputed. The bordering territory of Puntland claims part of the Sool and Sanaag region. Because the state did not show commitment to the people of the region it was difficult to get an accurate picture of their support for a Somaliland state. People were not blind to the fact that they received less economic benefits than the central western areas. This resulted in e.g. very few schools in the eastern region. In this way the government was upholding a possible destabilizing factor. Because of the weak presence of the government one Representative said that the people of these regions were not giving their full support to a Somaliland state (Interview April 21st II).

Both the issue of unemployment and uneven development points to something that has to be taken seriously in terms of lasting stability. Somaliland's lack of recognition by the outside world makes them extremely vulnerable as they have little control over their economy. Development projects will as much be the result of what the outside world wants to sponsor and maybe less of needs put forward by the executive. Somaliland needs to create an environment of stability and trust on all levels in order to be able to make it as a state. The fact that some of the territory is disputed because the clans that live there also live in bordering territories in the former Somalia makes it even more important to be able to control the distribution of for instance important infrastructure in a just way that is seen to benefit the whole country, not only the core area, the western part which is also considered to be *Isaaq* land, the largest clan in Somaliland. It will also be crucial to be able to stimulate economic activity in the more remote areas in order for these areas to be integrated in the economy of Somaliland. This will prove to be crucial over time. With no strengthening of the links between the center and the periphery within Somaliland the conflicts will start to bud as they are more vulnerable to pressure from the outside. Today that pressure comes from Puntland that claims parts of both Sanaag and Sool. The population in the areas is holding back their loyalty in order to see what will benefit them more, being a part of Somaliland that aims at being an independent state and Puntland that is waiting for Somalia to stabilize in order to reenter. Today these conflicts demand military resources diverting attention from the most important task, that improvement of both social and physical infrastructure and integration in a non-conflict way is the only way to secure stability and

loyalty to the Somaliland state over time. Still the Somaliland state has legitimacy and support in the population in the fact that they have been able to provide effective protection from violence and to withstand security provisions from the outside, e. g. through the United Nations (UN) giving a sense of self-reliance (Brons 2001)

Being in the executive was seen as a difficult job. The salary for a minister was around US\$ 400 a month (April 21st 2001). A minister pointed to the fact that the most competent for the challenging top jobs were abroad or they were working for international NGOs like the UN. The low pay was not encouraging Somalis with higher education to return to the country. There was always the problem of clan. Occasionally there would be accusation of one clan getting the favorable positions in the system. Because of this when someone had to leave their position one had to try to be sure that the replacement did not create any imbalance in the clan balance because this could eventually create conflict. When hiring in the bureaucracy it was claimed that the process was open to the public and that people were hired after merits. In this way they hoped that they could avoid accusations of tribalism. The representatives on the other hand were quite sure that the hiring process was biased towards some groups and that the openness of the process could be questioned (interview April 24th).

Civil society permeates the state in this way to a large degree in Africa. This is explained with the fact that the state is one of few arenas to secure a living and maintain one's networks through patrimonial distribution of spoils. The salaries in an infant state like Somaliland were not inflated but they certainly amounted to a lot more than what ordinary people taking jobs could expect to get. Brain drain has been a feature of Somaliland for a long time. The post-independence period probably contributed to most of it as Somaliland quite fast became a province due to the heavy centralization of both the state and development strategies that benefited the south over the north, the urban areas over the rural and in some periods also agriculture over animal husbandry. The salaries were in that sense too low to attract well educated and competent people for abroad. A lot of politicians and ministers did have private interests in business too. Some explained that this was necessary in order to make a good living. This meant that they had links and connections that by the public and the media were seen as problematic because it was believed that they would protect their private economic interests at all times and that might conflict with the general interest of the public. It was also seen as more beneficial to do business in Somaliland than taking office since the latter paid less.

Even though the strong links between different elite segments does not benefit the people of Somaliland as much as one could hope for when it comes to economic development these links are probably an important factor that makes it possible to avoid bigger conflicts and makes the will to negotiate and achieve compromises rather as the elite has the most economic gain from stability. In order for the Somaliland state to succeed they will have to find strategies that are more beneficial in regard of social redistribution within the whole population than what they have today. The set-up is beneficial in that it promotes strong horizontal elite integration and the consociational elements are there to quite some degree and this in turn is promoting stability and room for some reconstruction processes to take place.

Guurti and the House of Representatives.

The representative's job was seen as very challenging. The Somalis are used to a central government (Interview April 21st II.) They are used to representatives that most of all represent them selves, their clan or the government, not the area they come from. Most people did not know the function of the representatives and it was also a problem that some of the representatives were not doing their job properly according to some respondents. It was unusual for the representatives to be approached by groups from his area that wanted to discuss political matters (Interview April 24th.) Most of the time people came in order to get a favor. They would for instance ask if the representative could try to get them a job by telling someone in the administration about them. This was explained with the fact that they were not elected directly by the people. The representatives were suggested as candidates by *sultans* and *aqils*. This meant that some of them probably were chosen from the personal interests of those nominating them and not on the basis of skill (interview April 21st II). The representative might be more concerned about satisfying the needs of the one who got him in than thinking of the best of the country. One of the representatives believed that the clansmen of a representative would back him no matter what he did (interview March 22nd).

The Executive found that it had fewer conflicts with the *Guurti* than the House of Representatives (interview April 21st I). Members of the House of Representatives explained this in different terms. They felt that the members of the *Guurti* were less competent in the functioning of a modern state and politics (interview April 24th I). They were often illiterate, they were not able to consider all the facts important in a case and debate them properly.

Another representative said that many of them had gotten their seats in the *Guurti* because the president wanted them. He claimed that money were used to bribe people in the nominating process in order to keep critical voices out of the system and get those loyal to the president in (interview March 22nd). In this way the most critical voices of the traditional elite were not heard and the House of Representatives came across as more critical and difficult to cooperate with.

The set up and basis for the system is rather clear. Because elections were not held the clans got their share in influence through seats in the parliament and holding office. What seems to have been given little thought was that even though there have been state structures in Somaliland since long before independence most people have little knowledge or understanding of how they work and how to have influence in a more democratic way. The representatives of the House undoubtedly had the hardest time coping with this hybrid construction as they were neither elders nor democratically elected representatives and even though their task was clear and their mandate was clearly stated in the constitution they probably had the weakest position in the system.

The members of *the Guurti* seemed less focused on the conflicts. They were quite clear on what were their task in the system. They were supposed to uphold the peace and felt that they had managed very well (interview February 25th I). They were not critical of the government spending and pointed to the limited resource base for explanations. They described it as unproblematic to keep in touch with their electorate, the clan and area they came from (interview April 13th I and II). Between sessions they would travel home and have talks with the different clans about what needed to be done and they would make sure to push the case when back in session (interview April 13th II).

No doubt the function of the members of *the Guurti* was much clearer than that of other representatives. They were given limited powers through the constitutions but the ones they were given they seemed to be able to solve in a way they found satisfactory. Major conflicts had been avoided ever since the last civil war and *the Guurti* was part of the prescription. What is on the other hand clear is that the rest of the representatives did not have much trust in *the Guurti* members as being independent and not in the pocket of the executive. So even though stability seemed to be achieved there seemed to be a lot of distrust within the system due to assumed and actual patrimonialistic practices by the executive in order to keep

conflicts off the table. Either as a result of a poor understanding of how the system was supposed to work but also because little thought was given to what kind of pressure would be put on the traditional system and its leaders from the state in general and maybe the executive in particular.

State/Civil Society Relations and possible channels of representation

In this part I will look at the relative importance of clan in general in Somaliland today and in politics in particular. I will also look at to what degree the state is able to promote vertical integration between state/civil society by their political strategies.

The Importance of Clan

My experience during my fieldwork was that clan is important to Somalis. When I got interviews my contacts would always be able to place my respondents in the Somali lineage system. Discussing politics they would always discuss it along clan lines especially when talking about the Siyad Barre regime. There are some negative abusive words used in Somaliland that refers to actual sub clans. Meeting my respondents some of them would already have heard about me and they would immediately place me in my husbands sub clan as the white Muuse Abdalleh woman. We were quickly placed within the greater clan system. I very soon learned that my husband belonged to the Garxajiis clan that is a sub clan of the Habar Yunis who are of the Isaaq clan, the Isaaq being the majority in Somaliland.

When Somalis from the Diasporas returns to their family back in Somaliland the expectations are high. The Somalis have few sources of income and many depend on their relatives abroad to survive. The first few weeks we had visitors all the time. They all came to greet the member of the family who was visiting from Europe, my husband. They all left with a bundle of Somali shillings in their hand. When I asked who these people were, the answer was that they were all the descendants of Wacays Alaleh Cilmi, my husband's great grand father. It was unquestionable that they all were entitled to have a share in our assumed wealth. In addition to his family his friends from high school also came by regularly and walked out with a little something.

During my visit there was a dispute over some property. The argument was between a relative of my husband and someone else. The men of the family immediately dropped what they were doing and went to the plot in order to settle things. Taking care of the registering of a land plot in my husband's name also entailed getting a man of his own clan to help them out at the land office. They spent two whole days in line at the office to get the papers registered. Everyone ensured that this was the best and quickest way.

We did not have a refrigerator in the house. Some of the stores around in the neighborhood did. My husband's brother suggested that we ask one of them to keep some food in their fridge. They would probably do it, because the owner of the store was married to "one of our girls", which meant a Muuse Abdalleh woman.

The paying of *diya* is also common. This is a major legal problem for the state and has by many writers been described as the major illness of the clan system. If one considers the case of murder the problem is twofold. In traditional Somali *Xeer* the defendant's clan pays the victim's clan *diya* which can be translated into blood money. The clan has to pay an agreed upon amount of livestock, preferably camels to compensate the other clans loss of life. The "prize" of a man was traditionally higher than that of a woman or child. Today hard currency like US dollars is common too. If *diya* is not paid there seems to be common acceptance for retribution. The person responsible for the murder risks being killed by the other clan. If he cannot be found someone else in the clan risks being murdered. This can be the beginning of a bitter and bloody conflict with innocents losing their lives. When the formal legal system of Somaliland functions the offender is brought to trial and is sent to prison. In many instances the clan avoids paying *diya*. The defendant often experiences that he is never safe even though he has served his sentence. The clan of his victim will still seek compensation through *diya* and if they cannot get it the life of the murderer is second on the list. Another scenario is that murderers are not brought to the courts. The clans come to an agreement amongst them and pay *diya*. The clan takes collective responsibility for the crime committed by one man. If the police try to investigate the murder they will most likely not get any information on the murder from either clan.

You do encounter most of the relationships that are described in the literature and especially by Lewis. Because of the situation in Somaliland with few employment opportunities especially for men and the fact that social services like child care, hospitals

and dentist are paid services where most people rely on wealthier relatives or someone in the Diasporas to cover expenses for health care or even basic foodstuff. You will be obliged to help the paternal side of the family, but it will also be expected that you help your immediate maternal family. It is very common at least in certain clans with intermarriage so the economic responsibility crosses clan identity.

The Clan Issue in Somaliland Politics

When my informants were asked about the importance of clan in today's politics they seemed to agree on one thing. Clan politics was a problem of the past. This I took to mean that politics today did not involve the kind of political manipulation of clan identity in order to dominate other groups as described in earlier political analysis. The members of the Guurti described clan as part of their culture and a building block for a new system but not suitable for the system of a modern state (interview February 25th I, April 13th I and II) One of the Representatives described it as something truly bad that conflicts with Islam. He accepted that the clan structure was the only basis for building up the new system. He still thought that by educating the people they would learn to think differently. The clan structure of society made people distrust members of other clans and this made cooperation and development difficult. He thought that the government should have taken the responsibility in educating people so that they could see other ways of organizing themselves than along tribal lines (interview April 24th I). The previous misuse of clan identities by the former regime seemed to make most of them convinced that a transition to a more democratic form of government was necessary. They all pointed out that the political system was not good enough before every one in the country could cast a vote. They also believed that a system with political parties would ease the strain on the clan system and make conflict along clan identities less frequent. This was because the law stated that a party needed to have members from all over the country in order to be legal. It could not have a regional or a clan base. The system should only allow for three parties to run for the final elections so that clan friction could be further diminished. This would make the integration of different groups even more certain.

When my respondents were talking about politics and clan they all were of the opinion that clan was a destructive force at least seen in historically terms. There was also widespread agreement that it offered the only basis for getting a stable political system to work. Most of my respondents either in the system or outside seemed to look upon democracy and tribalism

as diametrically opposite ways of doing politics. Still everybody talked about justice for all clans, representation for all clans and influence for all clans.

Thinking of clan as a political problem has been the common and public view since before independence. The only problem of looking at it this way is that it totally ignores or at least tries to ignore the fact that clan is one of the only functioning structures for social redistribution in Somaliland today. For instance there is no collection of for instance *zakaat* in Somaliland; it is left to people themselves to decide who their *zakaat* should go to (WSP International Somali Program 2005). Most of the time *zakaat* is given to relatives something that is possible as long as they qualify for receiving *zakaat*. There barely exists free public services in Somaliland which makes most people depend on economic support from their relatives in order to get e.g. medical treatment. This support is commonly retrieved from more wealthy relatives in their close family or from relatives abroad.

The limited resources of the state and the prior conflicts and their solution has shown that the clan system has been crucial in order to obtain stability and to be able to get started with the task of rehabilitating both social, economic and political infrastructure in Somaliland. Politics in Somaliland at the time of the fieldwork was expressed in terms of distribution of clan influence and depended on a conception of equity among clans. There seemed to be little dispute over the number of representatives that each group had gotten during the peace processes within the system itself. Each clan had gotten a certain number and they had negotiated the further division between the sub clans amongst themselves. On informant claimed that everyone of course wanted more influence through more representatives (interview February 27th). He considered this quite common in politics but said that the seats given to each clan was respected by all groups. Only once had there been a change of numbers and that had been within the Isaaq clan. I learned through informal conversations with some of my contacts in Hargeysa that even the groups that are not considered Somalis and that were socially segregated from the Somalis were represented in all organs. When conflicts arose they seemed to be solved within the clan system but that did not necessarily mean that it was solved within the political system.

The big question is how to actually handle the fact that this has been the major structure of political mobilization since colonial time and find a suitable and acceptable way to integrate it into the modern day political formations? The clan system is by many people perceived as

a static structure that does not change much over time. This is an old fashioned way of seeing this kind of social construction. The clan system is as prone to change as any other networks and has changed a lot under the influence of changing political, economic and social circumstances. The development of the clan structure into a network readily available to promote singular interests on the top has been a consequence of first and foremost the lack of sustainable economic development. The latter is unfortunately a stable trend and this makes it crucial to look at how this tendency towards clientelistic networks could be countered. The system as such does not rid Somali politics of this. I believe the clan structure is a living and developing structure and its vitality is proved in how it has in fact been able to contain conflicts in Somaliland but there is a need to actively go in and negotiate how the negative consequences of this structure is supposed to be countered, not only by the state but by civil society, the clans themselves. The clans are still tools in the hands of the elite and this has to change in order for a more positive development to take place both in politics and in society in general. Civil society is not able to participate in the structuring of politics even though the clan structure in theory would make this possible and this is the problem that was never solved, how do we promote real participation from below?

The legislative and civil society

The people I talked to that were not formally in the system had different opinions upon the functioning of the legislative. The general sentiment was that they were skeptical to what degree in which the elected representatives could be said to represent the community. A major objection was that the processes giving the representatives were not in any circumstances democratic (Interview April 6th respondent I and II). Respondent I thought that the whole process was tainted and that the representatives had no legitimacy in the population:

“For example, the guy that represents us in the parliament was not elected by us. He was put there by an elder.” (Interview April 6th respondent I)

He believed that the process had not at any time included large segments of the population and that Egal prepared the election of the parliament. He also claimed that people had little faith in their representatives. Respondent II was not that critical. He felt that his representative in the *Guurti* did a good job. He was in touch with the community and brought members from the community with him in order for them to address the group's grievances.

This was a reoccurring theme with all respondents whether in the system or outside. Were the state adhering to democratic principles or as it seemed, were they prone to patrimonial distribution of power and spoils highly associated with former state structures? The naturally following worry would of course be if the clan structure yet again was being susceptible for manipulation by segments that wanted to monopolize power and in that way over time cause political disintegration. Another observation that was also realized within the system was the fact that it did not seem like every one did their best in following up their community either because they lacked legitimacy within their respective communities or because they did not have a clear idea of how to go about the task of being a representative. A problem that is stated by Lijphart himself is the fact that when one is dealing with a system that integrates elite from different groups the processes might lack transparency. In Somaliland there has also been a change over the years where elites are becoming urban dwellers and still represent the rural communities they come from. To some this has meant a modernization of the elite segments that was thought necessary when being a representative in a modern political system and to some this meant that the rural part of the clan lost some of their influence. What at least seems probable is that the elites that are within the system would build more trust if the processes they entered were more open to the public and the settlements reached open to public scrutiny.

Another objection to the legislative was related to the number of representatives designated to each group (Interview April 6th respondent I). One way of determining a clan's size has been to look at the number of names. The Somalis trace their lineage through their name and those with the most paternal ancestors in their name are considered the biggest. This is the traditional way of determining a clan's strength and not a very scientific method and it is not proven to be accurate. As an example he used the Isaaq clan where he belonged to a sub clan. The Isaaq clan was split into eight major clans and these got an equal share of seats in both the House of Representatives and the *Guurti*. This did not reflect the fact that these groups were different in actual size. The civil war in 1993 was the result of discontent within the Isaaq. The Garxajiis sub clan and the Habar Yunis in particular were alienated by the system and he thought that the unfair distribution of seats and power within his clan was a cause.

Somaliland was suffering from the fact that no census has been done for years and all calculations upon both the size of the population and the actual size of a clan were estimates

or the traditional way of assessing a clan's size had been used. There seemed to be a general conception within the smaller clans losing to the bigger both within the majority clan of the Isaaq and other clans towards the Isaaq. Consequently there were grievances put forward on behalf of the smaller clans. This was not necessarily seen as a threat to the system but a way of getting focus on the issues. This seemed to be a challenge to the transitional structure, how to be able to make sure that all the groups felt that they had real influence. This is probably the most common problem in a structure where power sharing between groups is the basis for the functioning of the state. In Somaliland there is no problem in identifying the group but their size is unknown. Neither did the constitution try to protect the smaller groups with giving them the right to for instance veto decisions they felt would be harmful to their group. Everyone was represented and their leverage would be according to actual strength like in representation or access to resources.

Another of my respondents who had participated as an observer in the Hargeysa meeting in 1997 also claimed that the representatives were not representing the community because they had not participated in an election (interview April 18th No III). The reconciliation process is often said to have been traditional and following old principles of community participation (Lewis and Farah?). He denies that it was as does other respondents (interview April 26th No II, April 6th respondent I). He says that the traditional system was good but that the latest processes were not according to this. He called it clan-based representation and he seems to understand it as negative and related to the former politics of the Siyad Barre regime.

The Somalis traditional way of organizing was decentralized and there was no central authority to sanction decisions made on inter or intra clan level. The state is a rather new invention in the Somalis way of organizing politically and it has displayed characteristics quite different from the traditional system. The state apparatus both during colonialism, the post independent democratic period and the dictatorship of Siyad Barre can all correctly be described as centralized. The centralizing tendency accelerated even more towards the state collapse. Over the last fifty years the central authorities have not been checked from below by an electorate in the same ways as in e.g. a Western democracy. The transitional system I looked at had the same problem. The educated and privileged elite have monopolized power and have over time accommodated new elite segments in order to sustain power. Staying in power has also meant being able to secure support from both traditional networks like the

clan and within the elite itself. The support from the traditional network seems to be secured by the mere notion of the value of having someone within the state system. The value of a network in itself is considered high even though the gain from it may vary considerable over time. The reconciliation processes did in fact include elements that were not traditional. In the reports that have been made this is seen as a sign of the ability to change practice as the circumstances change. But taking into account that large parts of the population still live outside the bigger towns the process came a cross as less democratic in the sense that it actually was seen as a purely elite process and rather urban based and with an anchoring in old elites formed during and fed by the earlier regimes which did not have the trust of the people.

There were different approaches to why a clan-based system was not a good solution but merely means to an end that is democracy in some form. One respondent said that the clan system conflicted with the Somalis religion Islam (interview April 18th No III) Very few, he included, had little to gain from the clan system. He even suggested that poorer people that often rely heavily on their clan for survival were willing to abandon this structure. Others rejected it on a strict basis of not being representative. They believed that as many as possible of the population should be involved in the election of their representatives and this criterion was not fulfilled at all (interview April 6th respondent I and II). The challenge that is surfacing here is how are one supposed to handle the changes that have occurred over the years in the clan system that was the basis of the system. There is evidence that suggests that even though the clan and the family is the basic unit of organizing both socially and politically the functioning of it has in some people's opinion been perverted. That even the man in the street uses the system in order to satisfy personal needs and that the collective thinking that once was the corner stone and a prerequisite for peaceful interaction and redistribution has been compromised both by the former regimes manipulating of the system and the war that has broken down family values.

My findings show that not all clans feel that they have a voice within the system and that the perception still is that the elite has its own agenda and still will and can mobilize through their clan. Clan permeates society and the Somali state's history works against clan as a political building bloc. There is little trust in some parts of society in the ability of the elite to be willing to integrate civil society in the state structure in order to promote real influence from below on politics. Still it is naive like some critics claim that most people are willing to

abandon the clan system if they could have a more democratic state and government. As long as most Somalis depend on economic help from the Diaspora and this comes through their family networks is not likely that anyone would actually renounce it. Especially for the poor where there are little employment possibilities a democratic system without a healthy economy to provide for basic needs like health care, schooling and clean water is an unthinkable option.

The Executive and Civil society

Most of my respondent that were not integrated in the system already expressed deep suspicion towards the presidency and the accomplishments of the sitting government. They were critical to the president in particular. The president at the time was Ibrahim Egal. He was the prime minister in Somalia's last civilian government before the Siyad Barre regime. Two of my respondents believed that the president was misusing public funds in private spending (interview April 6th respondent I and II). "This is a one man show. Egal is the ultimate decision maker!" (Interview April 6th respondent I). It was common knowledge that the president would dismiss any member of government if he disliked what he did. He would contact the elders of the minister's clan and ask them to replace him. I learned during my fieldwork that there was a high turnover in prestigious positions like ministers and mayors of the major towns of Berbera and Hargeysa. People talked about it but none of the respondents within the system mentioned it. When I was in Hargeysa the president established a committee that would look into the problem of corruption. He first targeted former ministers and employees that had gotten their houses subsidized because of their government employment. The mayor of Hargeysa was arrested as was his predecessor and a former mayor of Berbera was also wanted but was not in the country at the time of the others arrest. They were all accused of embezzlement of public funds (The Republican April 28th 2001). The Mayor of Hargeysa was reinstated a few months later and freed of all charges. The Republican questioned the fact that the researchers did not sweep their own front step, the government, before lashing out at others. They assumed that the committee was merely a tool in order to intimidate political opponents as free elections and the party system was scheduled to take place within that year. The president was desperate for support and would do what it took to get another term. Either by asking the parliament for a new term and a further postponement of the elections or by making sure that his party was able to get enough support to qualify to run for the elections.

Another of my respondents joined in with the opinion of a member of the House of Representatives (interview March 22nd, April 18th III) He was very critical to the government spending and claimed that it was not correct to talk about government spending in relation to rehabilitation of schools, water supplies and health care.

“Believe me. You will not find in this city or any other place any project that the government is responsible or. [...] They will take you to any project; it must have been funded by the UN agencies here or European Union (EU) donor project.”
(interview March 22nd, April 18th III)

Moving around in Hargeysa and on a trip to the mountain village of Sheik and the port of Berbera this was also fairly obvious to me. The road between Berbera and Hargeysa was rehabilitated with funding from the EU. In Sheik they were rehabilitating the secondary school with money from a German organization-SOS. The improvement of the port in Berbera has been facilitated by EU funds and I also met a representative for DANIDA when visiting the port facilities. They were looking into funding further rehabilitation of the port.

All of my respondents who were outside of the political system talked about the fact that development were a privilege of the western parts of Somaliland (interview March 17th, April 6th and April 18th III). My respondents were all living in Hargeysa but were critical to the lack of both projects and government agencies in parts of the country. One respondent questioned the entire existence of a Somaliland state because of this. The government had not provided the communities with services like free schooling. If you got sick and went to the hospital you would be told to get a prescription from the pharmacy and the necessary equipment to administer it. If there were services at all you would have to pay. My experience was that most ordinary Somalis were not able to pay for these things and depended on family or friends in order to borrow the money they needed to get medical treatment and often family abroad. In Hargeysa everything could be bought for money, but in many other parts people were left to themselves.

The president's lack of commitment to getting Somaliland recognized by the international community was brought up by all respondents. The fact that he on some occasions said he was ready to engage in talks with the south as soon as they had a government that represented the community seemed to have been very provoking. When he agreed to see a UN representative who was believed by the Republican and the House of Representatives to give a negative portrayal of the situation in Somaliland to his organization it was commented

by the media several times. In my interviews all the different opinions upon what a Somali state should constitute surfaced. My two respondents in the interview April 6th disagreed to whether Somaliland actually was a state or not but agreed that recognition was a must in order to get a government that was strong enough to instigate development to the whole country.

The respondents were all under the impression that some clans were favored by the government and the system in general. The president's clan was assumed to have prominence over other clans. There were claims of a hiring practice that favored the Habar Awal which was the clan of the sitting president (interview April 18th). This is a returning problem through out the history of the Somalis in general.

As my analyses shows, the problem of clan seems to persist in the new system. There seems to be few ways of changing the patrimonialistic way these networks have functioned and developed and the evidence seems to be in the conceived lack of development discriminating smaller and more peripheral clans and the eastern parts of Somaliland and also in the fact that the executive itself is associated with this type of structures and uses them in order to avoid unrest within and outside of the system. The meager financial base of the state as it is not internationally recognized seems to be a mixed blessing. The geopolitical importance of Somaliland and Somalia has changed after the end of the Cold War. This in turn has changed the financing of the state apparatus. Money is put into reconstruction and the facilitating of social services by a multitude of legitimate sources and the state in fact has limited control over their resources. This in turn probably makes the patrimonialistic structuring of the state/society relationship less threatening to the upholding of post-conflict stability. No doubt would the recognition of Somaliland as a state make the cash flow into the country larger and the possibility to instigate a broad economic development would be there as it would be easier to explore the possibility of widening the economic base of Somaliland from being totally dependent on live stock import to also include e.g. the use of natural resources that are admittedly there, both oil and minerals. But without solving the problem of clan based patrimonialism which is a hinder for real vertical political integration it might as well be a dangerous development.

Concluding remarks

In this chapter I have looked at how the elite within the system choose to act and to what degree their strategies are promoting stability and integration both horizontally on the elite level and vertical state/society integration. There seems to be sufficient horizontally elite integration in order to sustain stability but the strategies aimed at vertical integration are not strong enough and are hampered by the patrimonial tendency of the clan structure. The most important political achievements at the time of my fieldwork were the disarmament and rehabilitation of the militias and having been able to create a stable economic environment by introducing a local currency, the Somaliland Shilling. The lack of trust in the executive's ability to promote development for all groups can become a problem in the future as is a limited economic base and the fact that the claim of independence is not entirely embraced by all elites and clans within Somaliland and by bordering Somali territories in the former Somalia.

Conclusion

In this thesis I set out to look at integrating and disintegrating political strategies within a Somali context. My main interest was the lasting stability in the northern part of the former Somalia, Somaliland. The former British Protectorate declared itself independent in 1991 and after successful local peace initiatives was able to settle the internal conflicts that were structured along clan interest in two reconciliation processes, the last ending in 1997. From then and up to my fieldwork in 2001 there had been no major conflicts and a rather well defined state apparatus based on power-sharing among all clans in Somaliland had been given the opportunity to exercise legitimate authority laying the grounds for economic, political and social reconstruction within a peaceful environment.

My first research question was to look at integrating and disintegrating elite strategies in a historical perspective. In a Somali context the central idea of a Somali nation without a state has been the single most powerful ideology that to some extent has been able to make different Somali territories try to meet despite radically different colonial experiences. The merger of the Italian and the British Protectorate reflects the uniting force of pan-somalism. At the same time regional struggle for dominance over Somali inhabited areas made the realization of a Somali state that gathered all Somalis utopian and ultimately geo-politics structured around the West/communist divide lead up to the starting of the disintegration of the former Somalia which picked up pace at the end of the Ogaden war.

The pastoral democracy is an equally powerful political idea that was given importance in the state building in Somaliland. The idea is that elite integration will provide a stable environment where all groups will have a say and where all parts of civil society can participate as it has its basis in a rather egalitarian non-hierarchical nomadic clan structure.

Somalia was from the beginning of independence depending on economic aid from the outside world in order to function. Even before independence clientelistic structures were developed as the Somalis were integrated in the regional economy through trading live stock and an urban elite who had been skimming the live stock market as middlemen was ready to be absorbed by the state in order to get benefits from the money pouring into the state from various sources. The Cold war and the struggle for influence and the spread of political ideas made Somalia an attractive client for the adversaries, the US and Soviet. Soviet and China

provided military aid and communist ideas over time that led to the military *côupe* in 1969 and the launching of scientific socialism. The politicising of clan was by then reaching unprecedented levels and the new regime sought to rid the country of the clan problem that was eating the state up from inside and seemed to be the single most important reason for the lack of economic development. The money did not make it down to the grass roots but became the prize for holding position. The Barre regime had little success in guiding a socialist development. Patrimonial structures had gotten so entrenched in the state that to stay in power and in control economic as well as military demanded the mobilization of ones own clan and the distribution of spoils to keep the support. The independence of Somaliland came as a response to social, economic and political processes that in the long run marginalized one of the larger groups in Somalia, the Isaacs that mainly inhabit the former British Protectorate, Somaliland. Southern clans and the Darods in particular had gained prominence over time and the southern parts gained economic prominence over the north. In sum the particular development of the predatory state was due to the Cold war competition that gave the state economic and military resources of enormous proportions. This paired with inefficient economic policies led to underdevelopment of the productive forces and a dependence on clan networks in order to have a share in the resources available within the state. Being cut of from the state and possible influence and economic gain gave a further politicising of clan identities leading to disintegration.

The political set-up in Somaliland was the result of local peace building and reconciliation processes that lasted for longer periods of time with few external participants with stake in the outcome. The clan structure was being used in order to get all groups represented in a system consisting of democratic elements but based on group representations.

My second research question was to see in what way elite strategies within Somaliland at the time of the study were promoting stability and integration. My analysis showed that there were consociational elements in this structure of government that have been partly responsible for the lasting stability. All clans were represented. There was also an understanding between the different branches of what the cost of conflict would be and the system seemed to have quite some capacity to absorb differences at the elite level. The absorption of the militias of different clans into the state's army and police force had brought physical safety back to civil society and given a considerable amount of legitimacy to the

government. Introduction of a local currency further stabilized the markets giving economic growth at least in the urban and western areas.

Still the problem of the integration of all groups and regions remained unsolved. The lack of economic development was seen as conscious strategies discriminating certain clans. The state itself was perceived as yet another centralized structure consequently feeding elites that had been around before independence in 1991 and continuously skimming the profits of being in position. New groups were integrated in order for business to go as usual. The constant rewarding and degradation of members of the political elite were interpreted as being the ultimate sign of that the patrimonial networks of the past still worked for the elite and deprived the ordinary Somalilanders of economic and social development and possibility to political participation. The fact that Somaliland remains unrecognized and therefore can not enter into unilateral relationships with other states and that the region has lost its political importance as an area that other states would want to influence has made the cash flow rather modest and not skewed towards military aid as in the past. This means that the lack of vertical integration is probably less dangerous in the sense that no group will probably be able to gain enough military strength to be able to challenge the system as it is. Still the fact that there seems to be few signs of real political participation from below which is meaningful and able to promote a broader reconstruction process that includes all groups as in clans, social strata and regions is problematic and has to be dealt with. The patrimonial structuring of the clan relations vertically inherited from thirty years of independence with unlimited state resources paired with little or no development of the productive forces has to change in some way in order for this local solution to local conflicts to work out.

The overall conclusion is that local initiatives and local/traditional structures are working and creating possibilities for reconstruction and lasting stability in Somaliland. The challenge is to make a good assessment how these local initiatives are functioning with more modern imposed structures like democracy. Indigenous African structures are structured by economic, social and political factors over time and this will in turn create limitation or possibilities when these structures meet the modern state. The main challenge is to be able to in the Somali case to change vertical patrimonialistic structures within clans to networks of real participation from below since the likelihood of clan losing importance in near future is meagre in an economically challenged state like Somaliland. This change can only come

about from within the clan structure itself and possibly guided by the political elite in the state.

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Appendix 1

List of informants

<i>Date of interview</i>	<i>Position within the political system</i>	<i>Additional information</i>
February 25 th 2001	Member of House of Elders I	Influential and respected elder in Somaliland as a whole
February 25 th 2001	Minister I	Short meeting, has held several positions in the government
February 27 th 2001	Administrative position in House of Elders	Worked in House of Elders since the early nineties
March 6 th 2001	Vice Mayor	Vice mayor in one of the important colonial villages in Somaliland
March 7 th 2001	Government employee	Working with taxes and toll
March 7 th 2001	Mayor I	
March 22 nd 2001	Member House of Representatives I	Member of SNM
March 25 th 2001	Mayor II	
April 18 th 2001 No I	Representative House of Elders II	
April 18 th 2001 No II	Representative House of Elders III	
April 21 st 2001	Minister II	
April 21 st 2001	Member House of Representatives II	Lawyer
April 26 th 2001 No I	Member House of Representatives III	On the board of a larger business corporation and a professor
<i>Date of Interview</i>	<i>Occupation</i>	<i>Additional information</i>
April 4 th 2001	Lawyer I Master of Social Science II	Discussion with two younger men with university degrees.

March 7 th 2001	Businessman within livestock	Also a sultan, a traditional position; conversations over a day.
March 17 th 2001	UN employee	Involved in civic education projects all over Somaliland
April 18 th 2001 No III	Executive in banking	Member of new political party founded on Islamic principles
April 14 th 2001	Master of Political Science	Master thesis written on clan politics
April 25 th 2001	Businessman	Lived in Hargeysa during civil war and lost most of his properties
April 26 th 2001 No II	Radio host	Expert on Somali oral culture heard on the radio, elder

Appendix 2

Interview guide

Possible respondents: members of House of Representatives, Guurti, other elders, the man woman in the street:

Representation:

1. Do you know how many representatives your group has in the elected organs?
2. Do you know how the appropriate number of representatives was decided?
3. Is the number of representatives according to your group's size or according to their distribution in regions or are there other criteria that has decided the number?
4. Is the number right in your opinion?
5. Can you think of reasons for changing the number of representatives for your group?
6. Has such changes occurred over the last ten years?
7. Why do you think that the number has been fixed over the last ten years?

Responsibility towards group and mobilizing structures:

1. Do you see yourself as a representative of the clan you come from?
2. Do people of your clan see you as their representative that is supposed safeguard their rights in the system?
3. Whose interest do you think people think a representative should advocate?
4. Why do you think some representatives are not reelected?
5. Why were you/your representative reelected?
6. In what instances do you deal with state officials?
7. When a family or a group has a problem do they first go to someone in their clan for help?
8. Is it important to go through your clan when you have something that you need to solve and when you need to deal with public officials?
9. Do you think that who you are and the clan you belong to is important in those instances?
10. How will the new party system work in Somaliland do you think?
11. Could you mention at least three good things about the clan structure as it functions in Somaliland today?
12. Could you mention at least three things about it that you find damaging?

Conflicts:

1. What is the common way of dealing with conflict?
2. Does your clan/group have protection under the law equally to other clans/ groups?

3. Has the establishment of a central government of Somaliland and the conflict resolution in the mid 90s solved the conflictual issues that were between different clans?
4. Can you give examples of conflicts in the early 90s?
5. Can you give examples of conflicts today
6. Are some conflicts kept out of the official system?
7. Are there often conflicts about politics between Guurti/House of Representatives and the government/president? Examples.
8. Are there often conflicts between the different clans within Guurti/House of Representatives? Examples
9. Of these two types of conflict, which do you see as the most problematic?
10. Could you mention at least three ways that the creation of a central state has benefited the people of Somaliland or your clan?

Political opportunity structures:

1. Are important political positions available to your group?
2. Do you think someone in an important position should be able to help his clan specifically?
3. Why/why not?
4. Do other groups have easier access to positions and the decision-making process?
5. Could you try to find some other characteristic of the people that have easier access than your group than clan belonging?
6. Has your clan's representation increased over the last ten years?
7. In what way is clan important today in the political, economic and social sphere ?

Sharing of economic burdens and benefits:

1. Does every citizen pay taxes?
2. Who then pay taxes today? Has there been a development in this area in your opinion over the last ten years?
3. How does the state spend public funds?
4. Do you think that the state spends the taxpayers' money in a wise manner?
5. Are there some aspects of the economic policy that you think promote tribalism between regions/different groups?
6. Are there some aspects of the economic policy that you think is promoting integration and cooperation between regions/different clan groups?
7. Do you think that your group has the same opportunities in employment and education as other groups?
8. If so, what do you believe is the reason?
9. Can you think of any demands that has emanated from your clan that the state has been sympathetic towards?
10. Is the state able to accommodate any demands from civil society?
11. Do you think that if accommodated they benefit everybody or just certain groups, economic or lineage?

